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ABSTRACT

In this high school U.S. government and U.S. history curriculum unit, students examine in depth the annexation of the Philippines. Detailed activities are provided to teach students about U.S. foreign policy, the growth of the United States as a world power, and expansion and colonization in the Pacific Ocean. The materials include informational handouts for students, background information for teachers, lesson ideas and outlines, black line masters, rubrics, application to civics and history standards, and primary source documents, including correspondence and diaries of key figures in the annexation of the Philippines, newspaper articles, and state department documents. (RJC)

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THE ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Teaching **American Diplomacy** Using Primary Sources

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CENTER FOR TEACHING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Teaching American Diplomacy

The Annexation of the Phillippines

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Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources

The curriculum series *Teaching American Diplomacy Using Primary Sources* is a collaborative project of the Center for Teaching International Relations (CTIR) and the Una Chapman Cox Foundation. Through a generous grant from the Cox Foundation, Ms. Karen Volker, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, compiled the documents that make up each of the units in this series. Ms. Volker also wrote the introductions and commentaries for the document sets. In an effort to make these documents more readily accessible to classroom teachers, the Cox Foundation engaged CTIR to create standards-based curriculum units to accompany the documents. These assessments and their accompanying activities were developed by classroom teachers of history and civics.
CTIR has drawn upon the standards outlined by the Center for Civic Education and the Mid-Continental Regional Educational Laboratory. Ms. Linda Bongiorno edited the series for CTIR.

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The Annexation of the Philippines
Using Primary Sources

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Primary Source Documents

Primary source documents are organized numerically according to document number.
For a list of primary source documents included in this packet, please see the first page of the document section.

Annexation of the Philippines

The decision to annex the Philippines marked a turning point in American history. For the first time in the nation's history, the United States had to grapple with the question of colonialism. In deciding to annex the Philippines, the United States accepted its new role as a world power with all the responsibilities that came with it. Until that point, U.S. expansion had included only points that were on the North American continent.

Although the United States entered the Spanish-American War ostensibly because of concerns about the way the Spanish were treating rebels in Cuba, some have argued that the desire to annex the Philippines was one of the reasons for entering the war.

CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

- Why did the United States annex the Philippines?
- What technology enabled the Commissioners in Paris to communicate in real time with Washington?
- What were the primary reasons for opposing annexation? Those supporting annexation?

While the war with Spain was very popular, there was much debate regarding whether the United States should keep the Philippine Islands as a prize for winning the war. It was one thing to be concerned about what was happening in our own neighborhood, some argued, but quite another to become involved halfway around the world.

Many opposed annexation of the Philippines for Constitutional reasons – arguing that the Constitution did not contain any provisions for colonies and that it certainly did not allow the United States to govern territories against the will of the governed. Others pointed to Washington's farewell address, which warned against premanent alliances. And, on not such high moral ground, some opponents of annexation opposed it simply because they did not believe that the Filipinos were "fit" to become U.S. citizens.
On the flip side, some imperialists supported annexation precisely because they felt the Filipinos "were unfit to govern themselves." (Here, the concern was not so much that they could not govern themselves, but that because of this inability some other country would gain control of the Philippines if the United States did not "accept the responsibility.")

Others in favor of annexation argued that the United States needed Philippines and Guam in order to secure access to markets in the Far East and create a military staging base for operations in the Pacific. Missionaries and others supported annexation of the Philippines because it would bring democracy to that faraway land. And, finally, many simply liked the idea of the United States becoming an empire.

Public opinion played an important role in determining officials' positions on the Philippines. Indeed, President McKinley is said to have made a trip through the mid-west of the United States in order to hear what the people thought about the issue. In the end, he supported annexation of all of the Philippine Islands, believing that to take only some of the islands would only invite problems in the future.

The Process

How does one go about annexing a territory? In the case of the Philippines, it was the direct result of the Spanish-American War. Often referred to as a "splendid little war," the Spanish-American War lasted only 115 days and resulted in the death of less than 400 Americans from combat (although over 5,000 died from yellow fever).

The first battle of the war took place miles away from Cuba, the principal sight of fighting. On May 1, 1898, Commodore George Dewey defeated the Spanish troops at Manila Bay in the Philippines and annihilated the Spanish Naval Squadron without the loss of a single American life. Word of his victory was splashed across the front page of every major paper in America. President McKinley, upon hearing the news, vowed to promote Dewey to Rear Admiral. Spontaneous celebrations were held as Americans shouted "Remember the Maine!"[1]

[1] The American battle ship "The Maine" was blown up in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898. Although no one knew exactly what had happened to the Maine, its explosion became the battle cry of the nation. Shortly afterwards, on April 19th, Congress passed a war resolution, the only time

From May 1st until the signing of the Peace Agreement in December, the United States held Manila Bay. The Spanish-American War itself lasted only until early July when the United States destroyed the Spanish fleet at Santiago, Cuba. By mid-August, the United States and Spain had signed a Protocol of Agreement embodying the terms of a future peace agreement, including language on the future disposition of the Philippines.

Both sides sent delegations[2] to France, which had offered to host the peace talks. As a result, the treaty which was eventually signed on December 10, 1898 in Paris is referred to as the Paris Peace Treaty even though France was not involved in the war.

The American delegation, headed by Secretary of State William Day,[3] was comprised primarily of individuals who supported annexation of the Philippines. The other members of the delegation were: Senator Cushman Davis from Minnesota, Senator William Frye from Maine, Whitelaw Reid, the Editor of the New York Tribune, and Senator George Gray from Delaware. Of these, only Senator Gray opposed annexation.[4]

The Commission's first instructions from the President (document 5) called for the annexation of Luzon Island and said nothing of the rest of the archipelago. As you will see from the correspondence that transpired between the Commissioners and Washington (documents 8-10), these instructions were later amended to call for annexation of all the islands.

The record of the correspondence between the Commissioners and the State Department provides a unique glimpse into how the process worked. The Commissioners were given their original instructions in September. Based on these instructions, they entered into negotiations with the Spanish delegation on a wide range of issues stemming from the war. The disposition of the Philippine Islands was only one of several issues covered in the talks.[5]

The Commission held hearings with experts to gain a better understanding of the situation in the Philippines. Their findings based on these hearings were sent to Washington for input into the policy-making process there (document 6). Also, as new issues came up in the talks, the Commissioners would report this to Washington and seek guidance on how to respond.

Although the Commissioners would make suggestions to Washington regarding a proposed course of action, they would not commit the United States to any position without explicit instructions from the Secretary of State or the President. A transatlantic cable made same-day communication possible between Paris and Washington. The ability to have immediate communication with Washington was critical to the timely success of the negotiations.[6]

By October, it had become clear that the Spanish Commissioners could not return to Madrid without some compensation for the Philippines. Washington authorized the Commissioners to offer compensation for the Philippine Islands in return for Spain accepting full responsibility for all of Cuba's war debt. The two sides agreed on a sum of $20 million. This made the annexation of the Philippines one of the most expensive real estate purchases to date, surpassing the amount paid for either Louisiana (about $15 million) or Florida ($5 million).

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in history that Congress voted for war without a direct request from the President.

[2] It is interesting to note that a special delegation was sent to Paris to negotiate with the Spanish rather than simply using the U.S. Minister in France. The latter, of course, was charged with maintaining our relations with the French, while the Commissioners were responsible for negotiating the peace agreement. This practice of using a special envoy (or envoys) continues today. Witness, for example the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace or the Special Envoy for Bosnia in the late 1990's.

[3] On September 30, 1898, John Hay succeeded William Day as Secretary of State, but Day stayed on in Paris to head the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.

[4] In the end, however, Senator Gray, reportedly won over by the offer of a judgeship in a circuit court, supported the Treaty.

[5] Document 11 contains the text of the Paris Peace Treaty. Article III is the primary article that deals with the Philippines. As you will see from the correspondence between the Commissioners and Washington, other issues, particularly Cuban debt, had a direct bearing on the discussions related to the Philippines.

[6] By the end of the 19th century, the State Department was able to communicate with its representatives overseas by telegram. These telegrams were sent electronically and were received almost immediately. This is a big difference from the situation facing diplomats at the beginning of the century when correspondence between the State Department and its Ministers was written by hand and sent by sea.

The agreement formally ending hostilities between the United States and Spain and providing for the cession of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines to the United States, was signed in Paris on December 10, 1898. As with all treaties, the Treaty of Paris needed to be ratified by the Senate. Senate approval, however, was by no means assured. Imperialists and anti-imperialists – as they were called at the time – were represented by almost equal numbers in the Senate. Indeed, the Treaty passed only by the tie-breaking vote of the Vice President, Garret Hobart.

The Filipinos, however, demanded independence immediately. A bloody insurrection, led by Emili Aguinaldo, broke out immediately and lasted for three years. More Americans died fighting the Philippine insurrection than in the Spanish-American War.

Nevertheless, America continued to control the Philippines for over 45 years. Then, making history as the first great power to give up a colony of its own free will, the United States granted independence to the Philippine Islands on July 4, 1946. The United States continued to have a military presence in the Philippines until December 31, 1992.

The U.S. Foreign Service:

- The number of Diplomatic and Consular Posts has grown from 4 and 3 respectively in 1781 to 41 and 318 respectively in 1900 and 162 and 75 respectively in 1997.
- There have been 64 Secretaries of State since Thomas Jefferson was appointed to the position on September 26, 1789.
- Benjamin Franklin was the first U.S. diplomat. He was appointed in 1776 as part of a commission charged with gaining French support for American independence. Later, he was appointed Minister to France in 1778 with double accreditation to Sweden in 1782-1783.
- The rank of Ambassador was first used by the United States in 1893; prior to this date the highest-ranking U.S. diplomats were Ministers.
- The last U.S. Legations (a legation is the office of a Minister) to be elevated to the status of Embassy were in Bulgaria and Hungary in 1966.
- Students wishing to learn more about the State Department and the U.S. Foreign Service are encouraged to visit the State Department's web site at www.state.gov

ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
A Civics Unit
Using Primary Source Documents

Overview:

Was the decision to annex the Philippine Islands in our national interest? Regardless of viewpoints, the foreign policy decision to annex the Philippine Islands in 1898 following the success in the Spanish-American War, marked a turning point in United States history. For the first time, the US had to deal with the concepts of colonialism and imperialism. In so doing, the US had to accept the responsibilities that accompany this new role as a world power. Prior to this, US expansion had included only areas that were on the North American continent.

There are historical records of a great deal of debate in Congress, the McKinley administration, the media, and the public surrounding this controversial foreign policy decision. The debate included such questions as, should the US keep the Philippines as a prize for winning the Spanish-American War? Should the US be involved in events so far away from home? How can we annex territory when the Constitution contains no provisions for colonies? How can a democracy justify governing territories against the will of the governed?

For this assessment, students use the issue of annexation of the Philippine Islands as a case study by assuming roles as special assistants to the Bureau of South East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the State Department . Using primary source documents, students analyze this foreign policy debate by developing a briefing book and participating in a Mock Congressional Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Inquiry Question:

Was the decision to annex the Philippine Islands in our national interest?

Grade Level: High school

Time Allotment: The assessment requires 1 hour of class time for presentations and sufficient preparation time given in class or assigned as homework to prepare the briefing book. It is recommended that students receive approximately 6 hours of instruction to be able to meet the civics standards upon which the assessment is based.

Standards for Civics and Government assessed: This assessment checks student's proficiency in the following standards for civics and government:

The historical context of United States foreign policy.
Students should be able to explain the principle foreign policy positions of the United States and evaluate their consequences.

Making and implementing United States foreign policy.
Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions about how United States foreign policy is made and the means by which it is carried out.

The ends and means of United States foreign policy.
Students should be able to evaluate, take, and defend positions on foreign policy issues in light of American national interests, values, and principles.

Students will be prepared to take this assessment and meet the standards when they are able to do the following:

- explain the significance of principle policies and events in the United States' relations with the world, e.g., Spanish American War
- evaluate the major foreign policy positions that have characterized the United States, e.g., isolated nation, imperial power, and world leader
- explain the tension between constitutional provisions and the requirements of foreign policy, e.g., the power of the president to make treaties and the need for the Senate to approve them
- describe the various means used to attain the ends of United States foreign policy, such as diplomacy; economic, military and humanitarian aid; treaties; sanctions; military intervention; covert action
- describe ways in which Americans can influence foreign policy
- explain the idea of the national interest
- evaluate the use of the national interest as a criterion for American foreign policy
- explain the influence of American constitutional values and principles on American foreign policy, e.g., a commitment to the self-determination of nations
- explain possible tensions among American values, principles, and interests as the nation deals with the practical requirements of international politics

ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEACHERS

CONGRESSIONAL HEARING:

WAS THE DECISION TO ANNEX THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST?

For this assessment, students analyze the issue of annexing the Philippine Islands as a case study in foreign policy by assuming roles as special assistants to the Bureau of South East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the State Department. Using primary source documents, students examine this foreign policy debate by developing a briefing book in preparation for testimony in a Mock Congressional Hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Teachers should point out for historical authenticity that if the annexation issue of the Philippines-- or any other territory-- occurred today, a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would be held and televised on C-SPAN. State Department officials would prepare briefing materials to be delivered to Committee members and at a later date, State Department officials would deliver oral testimony to Committee members and answer follow-up questions from Senators. The role of the citizen in influencing foreign policy decision making would also become apparent-- through letters, phone calls, faxes, and most recently, e-mail correspondence. In 1899, the decision to annex the Philippines was assigned to a group of Peace Commissioners who communicated with the Secretary of State who, in turn was in constant communication with President McKinley.

To provide a context for this assessment, at your discretion, conduct the introductory activities with students: (1) "What is Foreign Policy?" (2) "Determining Foreign Policy Priorities"; (3) "Tools of the Trade: Diplomacy"; and (4) "I Guess I'll Keep 'Em."

Because this assessment will be completed by groups, divide class into groups of 4-5 students. Distribute Handout #4, " Annexation of the Philippines: Time Line," the list of primary source materials and packet of materials to students. Read directions out loud, explaining that each group will prepare a briefing book on the issue of annexing the Philippine Islands in preparation for a 4-5 minute presentation (testimony) to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Allow class time for students to meet in groups and to assign various tasks necessary for completion of the briefing book. Explain that much of the preparation for this assessment will be completed as homework.

Set a date for the Congressional Hearing. Video-taping students' hearing presentations and re-playing their performances allows teachers flexibility in scoring (i.e., changing scores of earlier groups based on outstanding performances of groups scheduled later.)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDENTS

ASSESSMENT: CONGRESSIONAL HEARING:

WAS THE DECISION TO ANNEX THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST?

Background: The foreign policy decision to annex the Philippine Islands in 1898 following success in the Spanish-American War, marked a turning point in United States history. For the first time, the US had to deal with the concepts of colonialism and imperialism. In so doing, the US had to accept the responsibilities that accompany this new role as a world power. Prior to this, US expansion had included only areas that were on the North American continent.

Historians have found a great deal of debate surrounding this controversial foreign policy decision. For example, should the US keep the Philippines as a prize for winning the Spanish-American War? Should the US be involved in events so far away from home? How can we annex territory when the Constitution contains no provisions for colonies? How can a democracy justify governing territories against the will of the governed?

As special assistants at the Bureau of South East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the State Department, the Secretary of State has asked you to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to brief members of Congress on the issue of annexing the Philippine Islands.

Step One: Briefing Book: Your group will prepare a briefing book on this issue to be given to Senators in advance of your appearance. Use the packet of primary source documents, your history text, and government texts in preparing the briefing book. Your briefing book must include the following components:

1. Map and historical background
2. National interest, including reasons for and against annexation
3. Foreign policy tools
4. Recommendations

Step Two: Congressional Hearing: Your group must prepare and deliver a 4 minute presentation responding to the question, "Should the US annex the Philippine Islands?" Each component of your briefing book must be referred to in your Congressional testimony. Examine the rubric that will be used to evaluate your performance.

Rubric for Congressional Hearing: Annexation of the Phillippines

Criteria weight	Pre-Basic (1 point)	Basic (2 points)	Proficient (3 points)	Advanced (4 points)
Understanding of Annexation Issue x 3	Few concepts identified, defined and or described.	Some concepts identified, partially defined and or described.	Key concepts identified, defined and fully described including significance of annexation issue.	In depth understanding of annexation issue; relationships fully defined and described, such as people and opposing view points.
Application of Knowledge x 2	Mostly inaccurate and inappropriate with little or no application.	Mostly accurate and appropriate, with minor errors and inappropriate applications.	Accurate and appropriate with partial application of knowledge about annexation issue.	Full, accurate, appropriate application of knowledge such as historical examples, effects, results, problems, issues, and future issues regarding annexation.
Reasoning and Analysis x 2	Support with opinion, beliefs and guesses.	Some support with more opinion than reasons.	Support and sound reasoning for positions.	Strong support of positions with sound judgment and evaluation; firm grasp of principles; logical inferences, opinions with reasons.
Supporting Evidence x 2	Little or no support of position.	Support for opinions is partially accurate.	Accurate evidence, but partial support of position.	Accurate support of position with historical evidence, examples and or illustrations.
Participation and Collaboration x 1	Participation and collaboration by less than half of the group.	Participation and collaboration by half of the group.	Participation by and collaboration among 3/4^{ths} of the group.	Participation and collaboration by all group members on an equal basis.

Activities

Unit activities to prepare for this assessment should focus on primary source documents. Four activities are provided below:

Suggested Activity 1:
What is Foreign Policy?
1. Begin by asking students to define the concept of foreign policy. Write their definitions on the board. Ask students to identify what their definitions have in common and how they differ. Discuss key terms such as national security, national interest, etc. Explain that a nation's highest priority is security, including protecting citizens against threats to life, liberty, property, ideals, and so forth. Areas of life considered worthy of protection and defense constitute national interests. For example, one definition of foreign policy is "the sum of everything a government does to pursue national interests."

2. Then have students give past examples of foreign policy or current examples from news reports. This could be given as a homework assignment in which students talk to others, read newspapers and news magazines, scan their textbooks, or watch the evening news. Do students' examples provide additional information useful in defining national interests, national security, and foreign policy? No documents from this packet are required for this introductory activity.

Suggested Activity 2
Determining Foreign Policy Priorities:
To further provide students with a general introduction to foreign policy and the debate over annexation of the Philippine Islands, distribute handout 1, "Foreign Policy Priorities." Defining US national interests and understanding how they are translated into foreign policy priorities is often very difficult. This lesson will encourage students to discuss competing demands on the foreign policy agenda of the US. Teachers might ask students to conduct a survey and summarize their results about current perceptions and evaluations of our foreign policy priorities.

Refer students to the appropriate chapter in their history textbooks in which the foreign policy decision to annex the Philippine Islands is described.

Divide class into several groups and distribute one set of primary source documents to each group. Each group member should take responsibility for examining several documents. Instruct students to look for evidence of a specific foreign policy priority from the handout. Students should highlight their evidence and write in the margin the specific foreign policy priority. Allow sufficient class time for groups to compare their findings.

Suggested Activity 3
Tools of the Trade: Diplomacy:

To introduce the concept of diplomacy, have students bring newspaper or news magazine articles that describe a recent or current US diplomatic effort. Distribute handout 2, "Tools of the Trade." Ask students to match the article about diplomatic efforts to a specific tool listed on their handout. Students should tape the article to a page and identify the diplomatic tool used.

Post their articles around the room. Encourage students to define the concept of diplomacy. Students should come to the conclusion that diplomacy is how nations attempt to accommodate each others' interests and achieve their own.

Divide class into several groups and distribute one set of primary source documents to each group. Each group member should take responsibility for examining several documents. Instruct students

to look for evidence of the use of a specific diplomatic tool from the handout. Students should highlight their evidence and write the specific diplomatic tool in the margin. Allow sufficient class time for groups to compare their findings.

In Activity 3, the following documents are suggested:
Document 1: Military action
Document 3: Disseminating information
Document 4: Military action (specifically paragraphs 2-5)
Document 5: Treaties, alliances
Document 8: Treaties, alliances (paragraph 15); Military action (paragraph 16)
Document 9: Treaties, alliances
Document 10: Military Action
Document 11: Treaties, alliances

Suggested Activity 4: Guess I"ll Keep'Em: Analyzing Political Cartoons

To provoke students' interest in the Philippines annexation debate, distribute the background reading (from the packet) and the political cartoon below (or create a transparency of the cartoon). Conduct a discussion in which students (1) explain the purpose of political cartoons in the general; (2) describe the historical context of the annexation debate; and (3) identify and evaluate the point of view of the cartoonist.

UNCLE SAM – "Guess I'll keep 'em!"

Citation: "Uncle Sam --'Guess I'll keep'em' " Leslie's Weekly (June 9 1898) http://www.boondocksnet.com/gallery/keep-em.html in Jim Zwick, ed., Anti-Imperialism in the United States, 1898-1935.

Summary of Documents

Document 1, News clips from the May 3, 1898 *New York Times* reporting on Dewey's success at Manila: The articles describe the success of Commodore Dewey in the Philippines. Celebrations are held in Madison Square Garden. Dewey is praised by President McKinley. The public discussion over what to do with the Philippines begins in the press.

Document 2, Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, to Secretary Day outlining reasons to annex the Philippines, Pacific Historical Review, 1898.:
2A and 2B. Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge writes his views on what to do with the Philippines to the Secretary of State. His memo includes a great deal of historical references to nations acquiring status and power by establishing commercial empires. Lodge sites the strategic geographic location and hence, economic importance of the Philippines. He urges the Secretary to keep the Philippines rather than return them to Spain which could use them to increase its own commercial strength. Like it or not, Lodge insists that the US has become a world power and we should not throw away any advantage we have gained through this war. Hence, the US should keep the Philippines.

Document 3, Editorial from the *New York Times* laying out options on annexation, June 27, 1898: The editorial outlines the options on the Philippines question before the treaty process begins.

Document 4, Excerpts from the original instructions sent to the Peace Commissioners regarding disposition of the Philippine Islands, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898: These instructions from President McKinley are prefaced with remarks about the moral obligation the US had in going to war against Spain and it is his hoped that peace negotiations continue in that spirit.

Document 5, Exchange of notes between French President Faure and President McKinley, including facsimile of McKinley's cable: Exchanges of notes between President McKinley and French President Faure point out the role of third countries in international negotiations. Page 2 is a telegram sent by President McKinley to Peace Commissioner Day, the head of the American Delegation in Paris. McKinley asks Day to deliver the President's gratitude to the French President for hosting the treaty negotiations between the US and Spain.

Document 6, Telegram from Ambassador Day to Secretary Hay outlining views of military experts on the Philippines, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898: Peace Commissioner Day (referred to as Ambassador Day because he recently was US Ambassador to England) explains to Secretary of State Hay the views of General Merritt, the Commander of the US Army, and other military advisors in the Philippines. The military advisors suggest keeping all of the Philippine Islands to avoid future insurrections against Spain. Some however, state their beliefs that the native populations are unfit to govern themselves; others point out that if the US doesn't claim all the islands, we would constantly be fighting Spain. Some military advisors provided an economic rationale for keeping all of the islands. It is interesting that most arguments are couched in economic or moral terms, not military-- even though the views are of military advisors.

Document 7, Andrew Carnegie letter to the New York Times against annexation, October 24, 1898: this document provides an anti-imperialist point of view from an influential American

Document 8, Peace Commissioners to Secretary Hay, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898: In this series of telegrams sent to Secretary of State Hay, the Peace Commissioners meeting in Paris outline their views on retaining the main island, Luzon, and/or the remaining islands in the Philippine group. Commissioner George Gray opposes taking any of the Philippines, based on our founding principles of self-government. William Day, the head of the U. S. Peace Delegation, explains his views on colonial expansion which would allow for taking the main island so that the

US can control an entrance to the China Sea. The Commissioners suggest a payment to Spain for all (or part of) the Philippines.

Document 9, Exchange between Commissioners and State Department: This discusses the need to offer Spain some concession on the Philippines in order to get agreement on Cuban debt, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898. This is the official State Department position given by Secretary Hay to Peace Commissioner Day, authorizing some concession to Spain in return for agreement on the Philippines.

Document 10, Exchange between Commission and Sate Department leading up to final agreement, including facsimile of Oct. 29, 1898 cable from the Commissioners, Foreign Relations of the United Sates, 1898: This series of telegrams highlight the relationship between the settlement of the Cuban debt issue and the cession of the Philippines. Both of these issues were linked in the peace negotiations ending the Spanish-American War. The Spanish negotiators insisted that if Spain was to accept responsibility for Cuban indebtedness, then the US would have to pay for the cession of the Philippines. As these various cables were crossing the Atlantic, it appeared that the talks would break down. Failure to reach agreement would mean resumption of the war against Spain-- which the State Department did not want. The telegrams given here point out the importance of the ability of the US Commissioners in France to communicate with Washington quickly. Instructions from the State Department responding to the proposals of the Spanish Commissioners could be sent and answered on the same day.

Document 11, Excerpts from the text of the Treaty of Paris, signed December 10, 1898, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898: The main articles of the treaty are: (1) Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. (2) Spain cedes Puerto Rico, other islands in the West Indies, and Guam to the US (3) Spain cedes all of the Philippines to the US (4) The US agrees to pay twenty million dollars to Spain after each nation ratifies the treaty. (5) Spanish ships will be allowed for ten years on the same terms which are accorded US ships. (6) All inhabitants of the Philippines will enjoy free exercise of their religion. (7) The treaty must be ratified by each nation within a six month time period.

Foreign Policy Priorities

Listed below are priorities for US foreign policy. The US does not exist in isolation. It is part of an interconnected world, where the actions of one nation can affect the well-being of other nations. Read through the list, adding any foreign policy priorities that you think are missing, and then rank the top five items according to your own priorities (#1 highest priority, etc.). Be prepared to share reasons for your rankings with the rest of the class.

1.____ Defending our allies

2.____ Protecting American jobs

3.____ Keeping up the value of the dollar

4.____ Increasing our military power

5.____ Promoting democratic forms of government

6.____ Helping to improve standards of living abroad

7.____ Strengthening the United Nations

8.____ Protecting weaker nations from foreign aggression

9.____ Combating world hunger

10. ____ Protecting our business interests abroad

11. ____ Achieving world wide arms control

12.____ Promoting human rights abroad

13.____ other_____

14.____ other_____

15.____ other _____

Diplomacy: Tools of the Trade

1. Meetings, summits, conferences.
2. Treaties and alliances
3. Executive agreements
4. Joint projects
5. Diplomatic recognition
6. Sanctions
7. Aid
8. Military action
9. Peacekeeping Missions
10. Intelligence operations
11. Participation in International Organizations
12. Disseminating information about the United States in other countries.
13. Public speeches made in the US or abroad to send a message to another country.
14. other
15. other

ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
Time Line

1897 McKinley succeeds Cleveland as President. Appoints John Sherman as Secretary of State and General Stewart Lyndon Woodford as Minister to Spain.

Jan. 25, 1898 Battleship Maine sails to Cuba.

Feb. 15, 1898 9:40 p.m. Maine blown up in Cuba harbor. Spanish blamed at time but recent historians believe boat self-ignited. 262 men killed.

Late Feb. 1898 Commodore George Dewey sails Olympia to Hong Kong in anticipation of action in the Philippines.

Feb. 25, 1898 Cable from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Dewey stating that in event of war with Spain, Dewey's duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then to conduct offensive operations against the Philippines.

Mar. 6, 1898 McKinley asks House Appropriations Committee for $50 million in military funds in order to be prepared for possible war. The request was passed unanimously.

April 19, 1898 Congress passes war resolution, the only time in history that Congress voted for war without a direct request from the President. Resolution contains the Teller Amendment disavowing any intentions to annex Cuba. Dewey was forced to leave Hong Kong because of the British declaration of neutrality (as opposed to the Congress' declaration of war). War officially declared on April 21, 1898.

April 22, 1898 Dewey asks for and received instructions to got to the Philippines, to capture and destroy the Spanish.

Late April 1898 US begins blockade of Cuba.

April 28, 1898 William Day succeeds John Sherman as Secretary of State.

May 1, 1898 Dewey defeats Spanish at Manila Bay. (Spaniards still control the island.)

May 19, 1898 McKinley issues ambiguous directive on the Philippines stating that America's purpose was twofold: to reduce Spanish power and to introduce order and security to the islands.

Aug. 12, 1898 Spain and United Sates sign the Protocol of Agreement Embodying the Terms of a Basis for the Establishment of Peace Between the United States and Spain. (This document laid out the framework for the Treaty of Paris eventually signed on December 10, 1898.)

Sept. 20, 1898 John Hay succeeds Day as Secretary of State. (Until then, Hay had been the US Minister in London.)

Nov. 1898 Anti-imperialist leagues begin to form.

Dec. 10, 1898 Treaty of Paris signed. In Article III, Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands and the United States agrees to pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars. In article IV, the US promises to admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States, i.e., to grant Spanish goods national treatment.

Dec. 21, 1898 President McKinley informed the Secretary of War that with the signing of the treaty on December 10, the future control of the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United Sates. Her asserted that occupation of the Philippines was necessary and ordered a military government extended to the while of the ceded territory.

Jan. 1899 Senate approves the Treaty with a margin of 2 votes. (Bacon resolution, carrying a pledge of Philippine independence was defeated by a vote cast by Vice President Hobart.

Feb. 4, 1899 Outbreak of Philippines insurrection.

Feb. 6, 1899 Treaty with Spain ratified by Senate (57 to 27).

March/April 1899 Anti-imperialist pamphlets drafted by Edward Atkinson of Boston and Brookline sent to Secretary of War and later to prominent officials in the Philippines.

April 2, 1899 the US Postmaster General ordered the San Francisco Postmaster to remove all of the pamphlets from Manila mail. This attracted lots of attention throughout the United States, raising questions of freedom of speech.

Nov. 1900 Bryan defeated as the Democratic Presidential candidate. This defeat marks the end of anti-imperialism as an important factor in American politics.

March 2, 1901 Congress give the President authority to govern the Philippines only until otherwise approved by Congress, exercising its rights and responsibilities with respect to foreign policy.

Spring 1901 Emilio Aguinaldo captured and forced to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. He signed a proclamation recommending abandonment of any further resistance. Other Filipinos continued to fight. By spring 1902, when fighting ceased, there were over 120,000 US servicemen in the Philippines.

Appendix - Other Assessment Index

- **Press conference.** Students role play a mock press conference in which President McKinley delivers a statement to the press and then answers questions from members of the media. A second student could role play the White House Communications Director who, in turn, attempts to create the appropriate "spin" on the annexation issue.

- **Position paper.** Students develop position papers on the annexation issue and deliver them in a session titled, "Choices for the 20th Century," at the annual meeting of the Foreign Policy Association.

- **Commencement Address**, Students write a speech, "Presenting Your Future," about the annexation issue and our national interest to be delivered to the graduating class of 1899 at a given university.

- **Political Cartoon**, Using the cartoon, "I Guess I'll Keep 'Em," provided in this unit as an example, students create their own. Cartoons are assessed on the basis of accuracy of historical content and the use of foreign policy concepts.

ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
A History Unit
Using Primary Source Documents

Overview:

The decision to annex the Philippines marked a turning point in United States history. For the first time in the nation's history, the country had to grapple with the question of colonialism far from its shores. Until that point, US expansion had included only points that were on the North American continent. In deciding to annex the Philippines, the US accepted a new role as a world power.

The annexation of the Philippines was tied up with the United States involvement in the Spanish American War. Some have argued that one of the reasons for entering the war was to claim this new territory. Debate regarding whether the US should keep the Philippine Islands as a prize for winning the war was heated using moral, political, and economic arguments. Ultimately, the Treaty of Paris ceded Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines to the United States with $20 million going to Spain for compensation for the Philippines. The Treaty was approved in a tie-breaking vote by the Vice President.

In this unit students will explore primary source documents to answer the question why did the United States annex the Philippines and what were the reasons for opposing and supporting the acquisition of these islands. Students will participate in three activities to familiarize them with the documents and then will be assessed in a letter written to President McKinley outlining their position on annexation.

Inquiry Question:

What elements contributed to late 19th century expansionist foreign policy?

Grade: 9th-12th grade with adaptations

Time: The assessment requires 2 hours to be completed. It is recommended that students receive approximately 6 to 8 hours of instruction to be able tot meet the history standards upon which the assessment is based.

Standards being assessed: This assessment checks the student's proficiency in the following standards for History.

Historical Analysis and Interpretation

Students should be able to compare and contrast differing sets of ideas, values, personalities, behaviors, and institutions.

Historical Issues-Analysis and Decision-Making

Students should be able to identify issues and describe problems in the past, including United States foreign policy after the Civil War. Students will also formulate a position or course of action on an issue.

Time, Continuity, and Change

Students should be able to investigate interpret, and analyze multiple historical and contemporary viewpoints within and across cultures related to important events, recurring dilemmas and persistent issues, while employing empathy, skepticism, and critical judgment.

Power, Authority, and Governance

Students should be able to analyze and evaluate conditions, actions, and motivations that contribute to conflict and cooperation within and among nations.

Global Connections

Students should be able to analyze the relationships and tensions between national sovereignty and global interests, in matters such as territory, economic development, nuclear and other weapons, use of natural resources, and human rights concerns.

Students will be prepared to take the assessment and meet the standards when they are able to do the following:

- analyze primary source information
- analyze and explain cause and effect relationships using historical information
- make inferences by analyzing historical data
- interpret historical data
- analyze public policy issues
- communicate ideas in writing
- apply ideas, theories, and modes of historical inquiry to analyze historical and contemporary developments
- inform and evaluate actions concerning public policy.

ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEACHERS

Students will demonstrate what they know and are able to do using primary source documents on the annexation of the Philippines with regard to the History Standards (see Overview.) This assessment requires students to take the role of policy maker and advise President McKinley on whether or not the United States should annex the Philippines. Preparation for the assessment requires students to be familiar with the events leading up to the Spanish American War and the subsequent acquisition of colonies. Students can become familiar with the documents by using the three activities included in this unit.

Distribute Handout #4 "Annexation Assessment." Allow students a few minutes to read the instructions. Highlight the importance of outlining arguments before writing. It is important that a position paper address opposing arguments as well as providing support for a position. Hand out the Rubric and review the criteria required.

Depending on the teacher's time schedule, this assessment could be assigned as homework or class time can be provided for completion.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR STUDENTS

Annexation Assessment

You are a policy maker to President McKinley in Washington. After hearing different arguments, you have been asked to tell him your point of view on whether or not the US should annex the Philippines. In addition he wants to know how the US should deal with Spain if he decides the US should annex Philippines. In a letter to the President explain your position. Include moral, political and economic arguments.

Outline your position and arguments before beginning your writing.

What is your position?

What evidence supports your point of view?

How will you counter the opposing arguments to your position?

What information can you use from the primary source documents?

Rubric for Annexation of Philippines
Position Paper

Criteria weight	Pre-basic (1 point)	Basic (2 points)	Proficient (3 points)	Advanced (4 points)
Paper supports a position x 3	Presents general and indefinite position with minimal organization.	Takes a definite but general position, and presents a somewhat organized argument.	Takes a clear position, and presents an organized argument.	Takes a strong, well defined position with a persuasive argument.
Paper uses historical evidence to support the position x 3	The historical support is missing key concepts, events, and people inaccurate.	The historical support features a narrow understanding of key concepts, events, and people, with some major topics missing.	The historical support features a general understanding of key concepts, events, and people.	The historical support reflects original thinking, multiple perspectives, and re-structures prior knowledge of key concepts, events, and people.
Paper compares and evaluates opposing arguments. x 2	Considers only one argument.	Evaluates and compares arguments within a somewhat limited range.	Gives consideration to more than one idea or aspect of opposing viewpoints.	Evaluates and compares from several different perspectives.
Use of primary documents x 2	Uses only the information provided.	Uses the main points of information from the documents to develop position.	Uses the main points of information from the documents and it is relevant and consistent in developing a position.	Employs all information from the documents and it is accurate, relevant, and consistent in the development of a position.

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Activities

Unit activities to prepare for the assessment should focus on primary source documents. Three suggested activities are provided below:

Suggested Activity 1

Begin the unit by passing out Handout #1 and having students fill it out by themselves. Allow 5-10 minutes. The purpose of this warm-up activity is to get students to start thinking about imperialism from a theoretical viewpoint before getting involved with actual historical events.

When ready, ask for student responses to each situation. Discuss the differences of opinion. In order to talk about all of the situations spend time on those that spark the most differences of opinion.

Conclude by asking students how are their views based on current political beliefs about imperialism. How would they feel about imperialism if they lived in another time period? Explain that they will be examining colonialism and imperialism at the turn of the century during the United States' involvement in the Spanish-American War.

Assign students to read the introductory history and background found in "Teaching Annexation of the Philippines Using Primary Source Documents." They should also read the Time Line section from the packet. Allow 30 minutes for reading. Review the chronology of events and clarify any confusion or lack of understanding. Assign students to read Documents 2,4,6,7,8 for homework. As they read, have them underline reasons for and against annexing the Philippines.

Suggested Activity 2

The purpose of this Interview activity is to familiarize students with the principal people involved in the Philippine issue, to develop familiarity with the different point of views concerning this topic, and to prepare them to take a point of view for the final assessment.

Students should be divided into groups of seven. Have students choose roles or have them draw slips of paper with each role written on it. If you need groups smaller than seven, delete the Commissioners Davis, Frye and Reid (consider them as one group). The following roles should be assigned: Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts; President William McKinley; Ambassador Day, head of the US delegation to the Paris Peace Talks; Andrew Carnegie, wealthy industrialist and philanthropist; Commissioners Davis, Frye and Reid, (all hold similar view) delegates to the Peace Talks; Commissioner George Gray, delegate to Peace Talks.

Distribute Handout #2 and review instructions. Allow time for students to answer the questions from their role's point of view. (20 minutes)

Put students in their groups and using the questions on Handout #2 have each group take turns discussing their response.

Debrief their interviews.

- What are the most persuasive arguments for annexing the Philippines?
- What are the most persuasive arguments for leaving the Philippines alone?
- What benefits do we have from hindsight in this case?

• How do you feel about how the people of the Philippines were portrayed? (The teacher might want to explain white man's burden, racism, and Social Darwinism.)

Suggested Activity 3

Students heard arguments for and against annexation and now they will apply those ideas to a political cartoon. They may choose any position on the topic regardless of the role they played in the Interview activity.

Distribute Handout #3 and review the assignment and criteria for a political cartoon. Put on an overhead or make copies of cartoons and review the essential elements of a cartoon. Students need help understanding symbolism in political cartoons so point out the caption, the use of stereotypes or symbolism, and that there is a point of view.

Allow time for students to create their cartoons or assign as homework depending on the time constraints. Make sure students have the opportunity to look at all the cartoons. This will help them in their assessment assignment.

Summary of Documents

Documents 2B, Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge to Secretary Day outlining reasons to annex the Philippines.

Document 4, Excerpts from Original Instructions to Peace Commissioners. This document is President McKinley's point of view on annexation of the Philippines.

Document 6, Extracts from a Telegram from Ambassador Day to Secretary Hay. This document provides reasons from military advisors for keeping all the islands as well as moral and economic rationales.

Document 7, Andrew Carnegie Writes on the Philippines in the *New York Times*. This document provides an anti-imperialist point of view from an influential American.

Document 8, Text of Telegram from Peace Commissioners to Secretary Hay. In this document the five Commissioners proved their respective views to Washington in hopes of influencing the decision. Three of the Commissioner (Davis, Frye and Reid) support keeping all of the Philippines (paragraphs 2-11.) Day disagreed in paragraphs 12-14. Commissioner Gray opposed taking the Philippines in paragraphs 15-16. The second telegram explains how it was agreed that Spain would receive $20 million for indebtedness.

Handout 1

Applying the Concept of "Imperialism"

The term "Imperialism" is used constantly in history and in discussions on foreign affairs. People disagree as to what situations are considered imperialistic. The statements below describe possible international situations. Read each statement and decide if country "A" was being (I) imperialistic, (N) not imperialistic, or (U) you are undecided. Put the appropriate letter beside the statement. Remember, you are just deciding about the actions of country "A". (Each situation is a different example and represents different countries. Country A, B, and C are different in each situation.)

1. Country "A" is attacked by country "B". A war develops and country "A" is victorious. Country "A" takes political control over some areas previously ruled by "B".

2. The leaders of country "A" and country "B"" are allies and believe in the same theory of government, Some people in country "C" are against the theory of government supported by "A" and "B". This country revolts and the leaders of country "B" ask country "A" to help put down the rebellion. Country "A" responds and helps crush the rebellion with superior military forces.

3. Country "A"" and "B" are in a war against each other. "A" wins and takes over some of "B's" land. "A" settles with "B" and pays "B" a large amount of money for the land.

4. Country "A" has a colony which has people of a different race, religion, and culture. This colony want to become independent. "A" refuses to grant the colony independence. The colony revolts, and "A's" army crushes the revolt.

5. People from country "A" settle in country "B" and a generation passes with the people from country "A" living peacefully in "B". They become dissatisfied with the government of "B" and revolt, win, and then set up a new government and new nation.

6. Country "A" is a major world power and invades country "B" and takes over. Country "A" rules the people of country "B".

7. Religious missionaries from country "A" go to a less developed country and peacefully convert the native people to the religion of country "A".

8. Country "A" sends experts in technology, agriculture, and business as well as financial aid to country "B". Country "B" is a developing country and wants to industrialize and raise its standard of living.

9. Explorers from country "A" are the first to discover and explore a region of the world where there are no humans living or claiming the land. "A" claims this land as part of its national territory.

10. Business people from country "A" gain permission from country "B" to establish companies in "B". Soon private companies from country "A" control all the production and business in a certain economic sector in country "B". Because of this control, country "B" does most of its trade with "A".

Seven Way Interview

The purpose of this Interview activity is to familiarize you with the principal people involved in the Philippine issue, to develop familiarity with the different point of views concerning this topic, and to prepare you to take a point of view for the final assessment.

Draw a name to role play and review the documents to find out your role's position on annexation of the Philippines. Answer the questions below as well as you can using the documents assigned as homework. (The following people will be involved in your discussion: Henry Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts; President William McKinley; Ambassador Day, head of the US delegation to the Paris Peace Talks; Andrew Carnegie, wealthy industrialist and philanthropist; Commissioners Davis, Frye and Reid, all hold similar view as delegates to the Peace Talks; Commissioner George Gray, delegate to Peace Talks.)

Meet in a group and discuss your answers to the questions listed below. Feel free to add personality and debate keeping in mind it's more important to be historically accurate than deeply theatrical.

Discuss the following, after you have made notes on your view (in your role)
1. What is going on in the world at this time that makes the US even consider having a colony?

2. What are the moral reasons or arguments used to annex or not annex the Philippines?

3. What are the economic reasons or arguments used to annex or not annex the Philippines?

4. What are the political reasons or arguments used to annex or not annex the Philippines?

5. What are the legal reasons or arguments used to annex or not annex the Philippines?

6. How are the people in the Philippines portrayed?

7. What are the issues concerning annexing some islands or all the islands?

Political Cartoon on Philippine Annexation

Your task is to create a political cartoon using the information from the unit. The cartoon must take a position on whether or not the United States should annex the Philippine Islands.

You will be graded on the following criteria:

- Position - Your cartoon must take a clear position concerning US annexation. It must in some way answer the question: Should the United States annex the Philippines?
- Content - Your cartoon must include specific and accurate information, including a caption.
- Symbolism - Your cartoon must include some aspects that are symbolically represented.
- Artistic Style - Your cartoon will be judged for neatness, use of color, quality of drawing, and creativity but you will not be graded on your artistic ability.

Appendix - Other Assessment Ideas

Optional Standards:

The following standards are different ways a teacher could approach "Annexing the Philippines."

- Students will be able to analyze cause-and-effect relationships and multiple causation, including the importance of the individual, the influence of ideas, and the role of chance.

- Students will be able to evaluate the role of technology in communications, transportation, information-processing, weapons development. or other areas as it contributes to or helps resolve conflicts.

- Students will know the history of relationships among different political powers and the development of international relations.

Optional Assessment Ideas:

- **Newspaper Stories.** Using Documents 4,5,6,8,9, and 10, students could write a newspaper story for each document outlining the process of diplomacy. Each document is an example of how the President used a variety of people to provide information for analyzing the Philippine situation. From military advisors, to Peace Commissioners and Ambassadors, to a Secretary of State the process was clearly outlined by the documents. Newspaper articles would highlight who was involved in the diplomacy, what they were doing and what was the advice.

- **Write a Memoir.** Students could choose one of the Peace Commissioners, President McKinley, Secretary Hay, or Ambassador Day and write a memoir of the time. The memoir should include the historical background that brought this issue into the political arena, the point of view and role the person played, and his thoughts about the final Treaty of Paris. Documents used are 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11.

- **Create a Poll.** Using the actions of the past, see what people today would do if a similar action were to take place. Students would take the events from the annexation of the Philippines and abstract the events into hypothetical questions about what should the US do if..... A sample question might be - would you support the United States if it took over another nation's colony in a war and then paid that nation for the colony? Students would be assessed on their questions - did they identify and rewrite the critical issues of the annexation into analogous hypothetical questions? Students would use Documents 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 11.

Annexation of the Philippines

Document List

Document 1: News clips from the May 3, 1898 *New York Times* reporting on Dewey's success at Manila

Document 2: Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge to Secretary Day outlining reasons to annex the Philippines (Memorandum from Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress; cover letter from Pacific Historical Review, page 237)

Document 3: *New York Times* editorial laying out options on annexation (6/27/1898)

Document 4: Excerpts from the original instructions sent to the Peace Commissioners regarding disposition of the Philippine Islands (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pages 904-908)

Document 5: Exchange of notes between French President Faure and President McKinley, **including facsimile of McKinley's cable** (Foreign Relations of the United States,1898, page 916)

Document 6: Telegram from Ambassador Day to Secretary Hay outlining views of military experts on the Philippines (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pages 918-922)

Document 7: Andrew Carnegie letter to the *New York Times* against annexation (10/24/1898)

Document 8: Peace Commissioners to Secretary Hay (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pages 932-935)

Document 9: Exchange between Commissioners and State Department on need to offer Spain some concession on the Philippines in order to get agreement on Cuban debt (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pages 936-938)

Document 10: Exchange between Commission and State Department leading up to final agreement, **including facsimile of 10/29/1898 cable from the Commissioners** (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, pages 948-951, 957-961, 964-965)

Document 11: Excerpts from the text of the Treaty of Paris, signed December 10, 1898 (FRUS 1898, pages 831-840)

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Document 1
News Clips from *The New York Times*, May 3, 1898

PHILIPPINES AFTER CONQUEST.

WASHINGTON, May 2.—The probability of the capture of Manila by Commodore Dewey's squadron led to some inquiries at the State Department to-day as to the procedure by which the Philippine Islands or any part of them would pass under the control of the United States in that event.

"The Philippines would become ours by simple right of conquest if our forces captured and held them," said a prominent official, whose word is authority on questions of international law. "It would not be necessary for Commodore Dewey to go through any ceremony of formally taking possession of the territory. Of course the title would remain in dispute until the conclusion of the war between the United States and Spain, when it would be settled by the terms of the treaty of peace between the two countries. Until the conclusion of such a treaty the islands would be ruled by martial law administered by whatever commanding officer the President might choose to appoint.

"If by the final settlement the territory remained in our possession, it would then devolve upon the Congress to determine whether it should remain a part of the United States, whether an independent government should be set up there, as it is purposed to do in Cuba, or whether it should be sold to some other power."

The holding of a conquered territory is regarded as a mere military occupation, according to Wharton, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty the acquisition is confirmed and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession or on such as its new master shall impose.

A condition of affairs akin to that which would be brought about by our capture of the Philippines existed in 1846, when the United States had military possession of all of Upper California. In 1847 the President, as Commander in Chief, authorized the military and naval commander of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror and to form a civil government for the conquered country and to impose duty on imports and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the Government which had the conquest in possession.

Something like this it is expected will be done in the case of the Philippine Islands when Commodore Dewey has captured and held them, or any part of them, long enough to entitle the occupation to be regarded as permanent.

Celebration in Madison Square.

In celebration of the news from the Philippines The New York Journal gave a free concert and fireworks show last evening at the Worth Monument in Madison Square. The music was furnished by the band of Squadron A and of the Seventh and Sixty-ninth Regiments. The fireworks included, in addition to many rockets and single bombs, two set pieces, one displaying the words, "Well done, Dewey!" and the other in red, white, and blue fire, "Remember the Maine." A large crowd thronged the streets and sidewalks and cheered the show until driven to shelter by the rain.

The Morning Post says:

"The United States must decide quickly about the Philippines. If they leave half done the task they have begun the consequences may be most serious. If they are not prepared to govern the islands themselves they must decide their fate, so as to prevent them falling into anarchy."

PARIS, May 2. Commenting editorially on the battle, The Temps remarks:

"The United States put into the balance a too crushing superiority of resources and forces to leave a doubt as to the result."

Later the Temps says:

"Directly Castilian honor has received the satisfaction it demands, will not the moment have come for Europe to say its word and take as a basis for its mediatory action the wise advice of the Duke of Devonshire in his speech of Saturday evening?"

LONDON, May 3.—The Berlin correspondent of the Daily News says:

"The German papers do not comment upon the American victory at Manila, but the opinion prevails in political quarters that the United States has gained the prize it had in view, as it promised not to annex Cuba, but gave no promise regarding the Philippines."

The Standard says:

"Whatever preponderance of strength Commodore Dewey enjoyed, he could not have accomplished the work without that mixture of dash and tactical resource which constitutes military genius. For the vanquished we can have only a feeling of commiseration. They evinced qualities that deserved success. Spain's best course is to submit to the inevitable and to purchase back the Philippines by formally renouncing her title to exercise rule in the Antilles."

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DENVER, May 2.—According to Col. W. J. Volkmar, Adjutant General of the Department of the Colorado, volunteers raised in the States west of the Missouri River may be sent across the Pacific Ocean to hold the Philippines.

"It will be necessary to hold the islands," said Col. Volkmar, "while the war is being prosecuted in other directions, and what would be more natural than for the troops recruited in the West to be placed aboard transports in the harbor of San Francisco and sent to occupy the important posts in the Philippine Islands?

"The Government may dicker with Japan as to the future ownership of the islands, but in the meantime the territory must be securely held."

DEWEY PRAISED BY PRESIDENT.

WASHINGTON, May 2.—One of the earliest callers at the Executive Mansion this morning was Representative Anderson of Buffalo. The President made the following statement to Mr. Anderson:

"Commodore Dewey's victory is one of the greatest naval triumphs of modern times, and will rank in history with the achievements of John Paul Jones, Nelson, Perry, Farragut, and other heroes. It is true that our ships were superior to those of Spain, but it must be remembered that Commodore Dewey engaged not only the opposing fleet, but the Spanish forts. The battle was a hard-fought one, and the fact that Commodore Dewey was able to win it shows that he is a hero."

Later in the day the President expressed to another visitor his intention to promote Commodore Dewey to the rank of Rear Admiral in consideration of his splendid services. If an act of Congress is necessary to bring the promotion it will be promptly passed by both houses.

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Document 2A
Original of Letter from Henry Cabot Lodge to Secretary Day

Personal.

June 6, 1898.

My dear Judge Day:—

As I told you this morning I have thought a great deal about the question of the Philippines. It is hard in brief talks of a few minutes to put one's views as one desires. For this reason I have drawn up the enclosed memorandum, and I ask as a personal favor that you will do me the honor to read it and tell me wherein my reasoning is wrong.

I desire to call your attention to the enclosed clipping as an indication of public feeling.

Very sincerely yours,
H. C. Lodge

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Document 2B
Original of Memorandum from Henry Cabot Lodge

MEMORANDUM.

The course of Eastern trade has been throughout history the course of commercial empire. When it came overland to the shores of the Mediterrean and was transported thence by Venetian ships to Europe it made Venice the greatest city of the West. The discovery of the route by the Cape of Good Hope by Da Gama brought decline to Venice and raised Portugal to the highest point of prosperity. The Dutch following the same route arrested the trade from Portugal in the days of their glory, and then England, in turn, took the trade of the East from Holland, and London has ever since been the centre of that commerce. We occupy toward the East the unrivalled position of holding one side of the Pacific. We cannot hope to get our share of that trade, which, if we take advantage of our opportunities, would be the lions share, unless we have a foothold in the East. The intense commercial rivalry of the present times has developed a new system of obtaining markets. The markets go with territory. For this reason Europe has divided Africa and is now in process of dividing China. If we do not secure a foothold in the East we shall be shut out from the Eastern trade. That this is not an imaginary fear is shown by the case of Madagascar. For more than fifty years two large mills in New England were made profitable by their trade with Madagascar. The French took that island and conquered it, asserting that they merely intended to establish a protectorate there. As soon however as it was fairly in their possession they surrounded it with their own tariff and the two mills in Massachusetts have lost their market. This indicates on a small scale what will happen to us on an enormous scale, if, with the European nations dividing China, we fail to establish ourselves with a large port and with territory in the East. Under the industrial system which we have built up, and under our protective policy, of which the President is the most conspicuous representative in public life, we have developed our industries until our home markets can no longer absorb our product. We must have new markets unless we would be visited by declines in

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wages and ~~with~~ long great industrial disturbances, of which signs have not been lacking. The old theory of competing in foreign markets merely by the price of the product is no longer practicable, for, as I have said, under the modern system markets rest on territorial possessions, and Africa and China furnish vivid illustrations of this process.

Another point to be considered, and ~~the~~ a most vital one, is the fact that we are now producing steel at a lower price than any other nation in the world. This means that in a very short time we shall return to the ocean to take our share of the carrying trade, as we did in the days of wooden ships, when our unlimited forests gave us a great advantage in the material from which ships were then constructed. Our return to the ocean and to the carrying trade means our entering upon a competition for the worlds commerce, in which we have not engaged for many years, and promises an enormous development to our industries and a great accession of the wealth and the wage fund of our people. We cannot hope however to meet with success in this direction without those bulwarks of commerce--a navy, coaling stations and ports in the East--which have become essential conditions in our time.

It is quite true that we shall gain markets at the conclusion of this war in Cuba and Porto Rico, and we can undoubtedly add to our share of the South American markets, but all these are small compared with the vast markets furnished by the millions of people in the East.

If we hold the island of Luzon and Hawaii we ~~will~~ shall have a cable line to London with only four relays, and I understand that there are fourteen relays between Hong Kong and Europe. Commerce follows the cables, and as we offer the most direct cable route, so should we offer the most direct and quickest steamship route. With our cheap steel and a foothold at Manila--which is the greatest commercial and strategic point in the East--the carrying trade would ~~follow~~ ^ rule into our hands very largely when the Nicaraguan Canal is opened, and until that is done would pass to San Francisco and New York.

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It is not for me to say what our policy should be ultimately in regard to the Phillipines, but of one thing I am quite sure: unless it is taken from us by force we should not ~~even~~ permit the Island of Luzon, at least, to go back to Spain at the peace. I think the country would be greatly disappointed if that should be done, and it would be very hard to reply to the criticism that we had restored the inhabitants of those islands, and the insurgents who had helped us, to the tender mercies of Spanish oppression. Moreover the considerations which I have tried to express, very imperfectly, in this memorandum, appear to me so vast and so far reaching that I do not think we ought to let go of the hold in the East which we have now not until they can be fully ~~valued~~ weighed. This could not be done during the war. We must have time for consideration after the peace. If it then appears wise to withdraw from the Phillipines it is easily done, but if we should give up the Phillipines at the peace they will be lost forever and we should never be able to correct the mistake. ~~but surrender them if it should prove to be a mistake.~~ If holding them is an error it can be corrected at any moment, but if we make a mistake in giving them up we have then committed an error which can never be corrected.

So far as other nations go England desires us to keep the Phillipines, and Japan, who s as her safety in the Anglo-American combine, desires the same. Russia, France and Germany undoubtedly do not desire us to keep them. They would like to see us hand them back to Spain, but they would much prefer that we should have Manila and Luzon than to have that port and island pass into the hands of any one among themselves.

I do not desire to anticipate anything which would come ~~not from~~ after the peace. The one point ~~to which~~ on which I am anxious to insist is that we should under no circumstance cede the Island of Luzon, or indeed the Phillipines group if we can take the other ports, to Spain at peace. If we hold them at the peace we can then decide what to do with them and nothing is easier than to give them away or to sell them, but if we return them to Spain ~~at once~~ the greatest commercial

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and industrial opportunity ever offered to this country will have departed for ever. It is no argument to say that this is a new policy. Of course it is new. The only question to be decided is as to whether it is for our advantage. We cannot decide except on calm consideration after peace has been concluded. Whether we desire it or not we have suddenly become a world power. From that we cannot escape. Granted that we are to be a world power we should not throw away any advantages.

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Document 3
Original of *New York Times* Editorial, June 27, 1898

THE PHILIPPINES.

We have said that, so far as we can now see, the Philippines, at the close of a successful war, will have to be disposed of in one of four ways.

1. They may be returned to Spain.

2. They may be given or sold to some other power.

3. They may be turned over to the inhabitants under a protectorate.

4. They may be kept and administered as best we can.

We have recognized the inconvenience, the difficulty, and the risk of keeping the islands and making ourselves responsible for them, and the obvious desirability of getting rid of them in any way consistent with our honor and our permanent and controlling interests. We have pointed out that there is a possible relief in the project of a protectorate looking toward independence, though as yet, this is a most obscure and uncertain alternative. We have seen no evidence that the islands could safely be disposed of to any other power. As to their return to Spain, we do not believe it would now be approved by the American people. If we are compelled to fight another Spanish fleet and an army at Manila, as the Spanish Government threatens that we shall be, the return of the islands would be practically impossible.

Meanwhile, though we are not forced to cross the bridge until we get to it, we are pretty sure that it must be crossed, and it is only common sense to make our plans accordingly. At the proper time, no doubt, we shall have the counsel of the President, who will be in possession of all the facts. But the final decision will depend largely on public opinion, and public opinion is formed by discussion.

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Document 4
Excerpts from Original Instructions to Peace Commissioners
September 16, 1898

The following document contains excerpts from the original instructions sent to the Paris Peace Commissioners in September 1898. As you will notice, the Commissioners were instructed to keep in mind at all times the fact that the United States had "no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest." What's more, President McKinley told the Commissioners that the United States should "be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action." With respect to retention of the islands, the Commissioners were told that they could accept nothing less than the Island of Luzon, but the instructions remain silent on the question of what to do about the other islands. Paragraph 9 mentions that General Merritt will travel to Paris "shortly" to brief the Commissioners on the military views with respect to the Philippines. Document 6 contains the Commissioners' report of their meeting with General Merritt.

Which paragraph addresses the question of Luzon? What arguments are made for keeping the islands? What are the "guiding principles" as laid out by President McKinley?

Begin excerpts:

Instructions to the Peace Commissioners

EXECUTIVE MANSION
Washington, September 16, 1898

1. ....In view of what has taken place it is necessary now to determine what shall be our future relations to the Philippines. Before giving you specific instructions on this subject it is my desire to present certain general considerations.
2. It is my wish that throughout the negotiations intrusted to the Commission the purpose and spirit with which the United States accepted the unwelcome necessity of war should be kept constantly in view. We took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations. We had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest. Through the long course of repeated representations which preceded and aimed to avert the struggle, and in the final arbitrament of force, this country was impelled solely by the purpose of relieving grievous wrongs and removing long-existing conditions which disturbed its tranquillity, which shocked the moral sense of mankind, and which could no longer be endured.
3. It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action. The luster and the moral strength attaching to a cause which can be confidently rested upon the considerate judgment of the world should not under any illusion of the hour be dimmed by ulterior designs which might tempt us into excessive demands or into an adventurous departure on untried paths. It is believed that the true glory and the enduring interests of the country will most surely be served if an unselfish duty conscientiously accepted and a signal triumph honorably achieved shall be crowned by such an example of moderation, restraint, and reason in victory as best comports with the traditions and character of our enlightened Republic.
4. Our aim in the adjustment of peace should be directed to lasting results and to the achievement of the common good under the demands of civilization, rather than to ambitious designs. The terms of the protocol were framed upon this consideration. The abandonment of the Western Hemisphere by Spain was an imperative necessity. In presenting that requirement, we only fulfilled a duty universally acknowledged. It involves no ungenerous reference to our recent foe, but simply a recognition of the plain teachings of history, to say that it was not compatible with the assurance of permanent peace on and near our own territory that the Spanish flag should remain on this side of the sea. This lesson of events and of reason left no alternative as to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the other islands belonging to Spain in this hemisphere.
5. The Philippines stand upon a different basis. It is none the less true, however, that, without any original thought of complete or even partial acquisition, the presence and success of our arms at Manila imposes upon us obligations which we can not disregard. The march of events rules and

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overrules human action.. Avowing unreservedly the purpose which has animated all our effort, and still solicitous to adhere to it, we can not be unmindful that, without any desire or design on our part, the war has brought us new duties and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly written the high command and pledge of civilization.

6. Incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship can not be indifferent. It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade; but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening depends less on large territorial possession than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges.

7. It is believed that in the practical application of these guiding principles the present interests of our country and the proper measure of its duty, its welfare in the future, and the consideration of its exemption from the unknown perils will be found in full accord with the just, moral, and humane purpose which was invoked as our justification in accepting the war.

8. In view of what has been stated, the United States can not accept less than the cession in full right and sovereignty of the island of Luzon. It is desirable, however, that the United States shall acquire the right of entry for vessels and merchandise belonging to citizens of the United States into such ports of the Philippines as are not ceded to the United States upon terms of equal favor with Spanish ships and merchandise, both in relation to port and customs charges and rates of trade and commerce, together with other rights of protection and trade accorded to citizens of one country within the territory of another. You are therefore instructed to demand such concession, agreeing on your part that Spain shall have similar rights as to her subjects and vessels in the ports of any territory in the Philippines ceded to the United States....

9. ...I have directed Gen. Wesley Merritt, the late commander at Manila, to report to the Commission at Paris, where he will arrive October 2, with such information as he may possess; and it is understood he will carry with him, for the use of the Commission, the views of Admiral Dewey. To the views of these distinguished officers I invite the most careful consideration of the Commission.

10. It is desired that your negotiations shall be conducted with all possible expedition, in order that the treaty of peace, if you should succeed in making one, may be submitted to the Senate early in the ensuing session. Should you at any time in the course of your negotiations desire further instructions, you will ask for them without delay.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Document 5
Text of Exchange Between President McKinley and French President Faure, September 30 and October 4, 1898

The following exchange of notes between President McKinley and French President Faure demonstrates the role third countries sometimes play in international negotiations. In this case, the French have offered to host the peace talks between the United States and Spain. Earlier in the Spanish-American War, the French had served as an intermediary, representing the United States to Spain and Spain to the U.S. Government. Notice the roundabout way in which both Presidents wrote! (Note: William Day was the Secretary of State and a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks.)

President McKinley to Mr. Day
[Telegram]

Washington, *September 30, 1898*

Answering your telegram of to-day, I request you to deliver to President of the Republic on the occasion of your presentation the following message in my name:

His Excellency Felix Faure,
President of the French Republic, Paris.

On this occasion, when the Commissioners of the United States and Spain are about to assemble in the capital of France to negotiate peace, and when the representatives of this Government are receiving the hospitality and good will of the Republic, I beg to tender to you a most friendly personal greeting and the assurances of my grateful appreciation of your kind courtesies to the American Commissioners.

William McKinley
President of the United States

President Faure to President McKinley
[Telegram]

Paris, *October 4, 1898*

His Excellency McKinley.
President of the United States

I have had great pleasure in receiving the American plenipotentiaries of the Spanish-American Peace Commission. During the audience Mr. Day read to me the telegram which you had the kindness to send me. I am much touched at the sentiment which your excellency has had the goodness to express in respect to me, and I thank you very much. I hope that the American Commissioners will have a pleasant memory of their stay in Paris, and I will do my best to make it agreeable. I sincerely trust that the peaceful work of the Commission will come to a happy conclusion.

Felix Faure.

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Facsimile of Telegram from President McKinley to Mr. Day, September 30, 1898

The President to Mr. Day.

Telegram sent to American Peace Commission,

Sept. 30, 1898.

DAY,

American Peace Commission,

Paris.

Number Four. Answering your telegram of today, I request you to deliver to President of the Republic on the occasion of your presentation the following message in my name: His Excellency Felix Faure, President of the French Republic, Paris: On this occasion when the Commissioners of the United States and Spain are about to assemble in the capital of France to negotiate peace, and when the representatives of this government are receiving the hospitality and good will of the Republic, I beg to tender to you a most friendly personal greeting and the assurances of my grateful appreciation of your kind courtesies to the American Commissioners. William McKinley, President of the United States.

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Document 6
Extracts from a Telegram from Ambassador Day to Secretary Hay, October 6, 1898

The following document demonstrates the wide range of views held by military advisors with respect to whether the United States should keep any or all of the Philippines as the Peace Commissioners prepared for their talks in Paris. The telegram is sent by Ambassador Day, the head of the U.S. delegation, to the recently-appointed Secretary of State Hay. (Until late September, William Day had been Secretary of State and John Hay had been the U.S. Minister to Great Britain.) General Merritt, on whose information the telegram is based, was the Commander of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. After hearing Merritt's report of the views of various officials on what the United States should do in the Philippines, Ambassador Day forwarded the information to Washington for use by policy makers.

The original instructions to the Commissioners provided for the retention of Luzon. As such, the main question in their minds was whether to keep only Luzon, all of the islands, or something in between. All in all, the military advisors, whose views are outlined below, came down on the side of keeping all of the islands, but the reasons for doing so varied. Some thought that the natives were "unfit to govern" while others were concerned that if the United States did not take all the islands, they would be constantly fighting with Spain in the future. Several pointed out the economic rationale for keeping all of the islands. As you will note, the argument for the U.S. keeping the islands was couched more often in moral or economic terms rather than military terms – even by these military officers. These views colored the thinking of the Peace Commissioners and influenced the thinking of policy makers in Washington.

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay

[Telegram.]

No.3] Paris, *October 6, 1898*
(Received October 7.)

General Merritt brings statements from General Greene, Surgeon Bourns, Major Bell, Admiral Dewey. Colonel Jewett, personal opinions of Belgian Counsel Andre, at Manila and correspondence of our military officers with Aguinaldo... ...Bourns several years in the Philippine Islands and opinion much relied on by Merritt. Thinks if a few ambitious insurgent chieftains could be disposed of, masses of natives could be managed by United States. Considers natives incapable of self-government because lack of good examples, lack of union in Luzon and throughout archipelago, and existence of race, tribal, and religious differences. Natives united against Spain. Strong feeling against monastic orders, not disposed towards the Jesuits. Islands as whole rich and productive: climate good as any in tropics.

Major Bell estimates insurgent forces upwards 20,000. Aguinaldo the most-popular leader, but maintains control with difficulty. Some of his leading men dishonest and wealthy natives opposed to him. Natives of Manila generally opposed to insurrection. Petty chiefs get money by blackmail and booty. Aguinaldo and his leaders will resist any attempt to reorganize a colonial government, but want native republic under American or other protectorate except Spanish...

...Colonel Jewett thinks natives would submit to any just, firm government, but unfit for self-government. Insurrection did not aim at national independence. Spain can not in the near future protect life and property in Luzon, nor could insurrectionary government sustain itself there. United States territorial form of government not practicable at present.

Belgian consul, according to Merritt, who gives much weight to his opinion, is intelligent man, wealthy, and largely interested in business and discloses business man's point of view. Consul says United States must take all or nothing. If southern islands remained with Spain they would be in constant revolt and United States would have a second Cuba. Spanish government would not improve. Power and corruption of office holders would continue. Spanish governors would still protect monks in their extortions. Insurrection began among lower classes, who make good soldiers. Since arrival of American forces certain members of native upper classes have joined rebels. Native character insincere. Upper classes include usurers, pawn-brokers, and

keepers of gambling houses, who will not risk their capital in rebellion, and would be glad to have American protection against insurgent demands for money. Rich natives treat laborers

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Document 6, Page 2

Extracts from a Telegram from Ambassador Day to Secretary Hay, October 6, 1898

inhumanely. Custom on plantations all over islands is to get workmen into debt and then hold them practically as slaves, and even transfer them with estates. Spanish Government always tolerated and protected this system. Enormous difference between even best educated natives and white men. * Chinese natives join sordidness and craftiness and are rapacious pawnbrokers. Spanish natives join presumption to duplicity. On (the) whole natives inferior and unfitted to rule. Their only example the monks and Spaniards. United States should have pity on them (and) show them something better. Under United States islands would increase in wealth and soon return any money laid out. Even Spanish merchants desire American protection. Natives do not desire independence. Present rebellion represents only half of 1 percentum of inhabitants. Only 30,000 rebels. Luzon only partly held by them. The monks want to get away. Natives will resist Spaniards, but submit to United States…

…Answering questions of Judge Day, General Merritt said insurrection practically confined to Luzon. Tribal and religious differences between the inhabitants of various islands. United States has helped rather than injured insurrection. Under no obligation other than moral to help natives. Natives of Luzon would not accept Spanish rule, even with amnesty. Insurgents would be victorious unless Spaniards did better in future than in past. Insurgents would fight among themselves if they had no common enemy. Thinks it feasible for United States to take Luzon and perhaps some adjacent islands and hold them as England does her colonies. Natives could not resist 5,000 troops. Revenues of Luzon, leaving out cock-fighting, gambling licenses, and poll tax, would more than pay expenses of government. No burden of any kind on United States and we would help the island. Chinese half-breeds the most enterprising element in the islands. Thinks we hold Manila by conquest and that the protocol did not affect the capitulation. He considered that the surrender was virtually a surrender of the Philippine Islands. He thinks it practicable and unobjectionable to hold Luzon alone where most of the rebellious feeling exists…

…General Merritt thinks that if United States attempted to take possession of Luzon or all the group as a colony, Aguinaldo and his immediate followers would resist it but his forces are divided and his opposition would not amount to anything. If the islands were divided, filibustering expeditions might go from one island to another, thus exposing us to constant danger of conflict with Spain…

…Answering questions of Mr. Reid, Merritt said he considered capture of Manila practically capture of group. Nothing left of Spanish sovereignty that was not at mercy of the United States. Did not think our humanity bounded by geographical lines. After Dewey victory we armed insurgents to some extent, but Dewey says it was overestimated… …To take Luzon would expose us to Spain's efforts to recover what she had lost. If disorders broke out in other islands, either through Spanish misgovernment or through attempt to sell to other countries, the effect upon our possessions in Luzon would be disastrous. Prosperity of Manila has arisen partly from its being the capital and entrepôt of the group. If we took Luzon alone and powerful European countries got other islands the trade would be deflected from Manila. A strong power holding Cebu or Iloilo would develop it at expense of administration, including army and navy. Revenue of whole group would be more than adequate for government.

Day.

Document 7
Andrew Carnegie Writes on the Philippines in *The New York Times*, October 24, 1898

CARNEGIE ON THE PHILIPPINES

To the Editor of The New York Times:

I read your editorial this morning with great satisfaction.

It means much when such an organ of public opinion as THE TIMES does not hesitate to say: "We have no hesitation in saying that it would be much, very much better for us to devote ourselves to the splendid career open for us in our own land, if that be possible."

"But is it possible" is your inquiry, which you say I have unanswered. Permit me to remark that how we are to get out of the Philippines is not in question; we are not yet in. The protocol with Spain reserves the question of the future of the Philippines. This morning's papers announce that, "as long Spain could not reconquer the Philippines, she is willing to cede them to the United States for a consideration." Admiral Dewey attacked the Spanish fleet in the Harbor of Manila and destroyed it. The people of the Philippines had revolted against Spain before that, and were successfully fighting for independence. Spain, however, had not yet relinquished its sovereignty, therefore possession of Manila was taking a step against the enemy—we were fighting Spain, not the people of the Philippines, who were doing the same. We were allies; Spain was equally their enemy and ours.

The obvious step for the United States to take when peace is declared is to withdraw her forces from the Philippines and let Spain try to regain them if she can. This we know to be hopeless. It is impossible for Spain to reconquer the Philippines—she will never try to do so; if she does she will fail.

Nations do not hold possession of places captured by war. "Where the flag has been planted it must stay" has no warrant in history. The allies were in Paris and dictated terms of peace. Did they think of holding Paris or France? Did the Germans when in Paris, or did the French under Napoleon when in Berlin? When the allies captured Sebastopol, did they come under any moral responsibility for the future condition of the people of that part of Russia? Not the slightest; neither is there any resting upon us in the Far East.

Human society evolves peace and order through greater or less disturbance. It was the cry against the Spanish Republics that they could not govern themselves; even Mexico not so long ago was thought incapable of self-government. These are all acquiring the art of self-government through the stern but salutary school of experience. So it will be with the Philippines. The people who have organized a large army and beaten their oppressors may be safely trusted eventually to establish stable government.

There are many nations in the world which have not yet succeeded in establishing the reign of law and order as perfectly as could be wished, but do we not recognize that to interfere with these would retard instead of accelerate the process? Through how many disturbed and bloody decades did our own race in Britain struggle forward to the art of self-government? The experience this task gave lies at the root of its present triumphs. The President of the United States should instruct the Peace Commissioners to retain one of the most suitable small islands for a coaling station, and notify Spain that, having accomplished the object of the war in freeing Cuba, we shall withdraw our forces from the Philippines. We may safely trust Aguinaldo and his people to establish a government and bring the Philippines into the list of nations more or less wisely governed, fully equal to Haiti, whom we have the good sense to let alone and allow to develop in her own way, and much better than Turkey. The Philippines concern the United States less than the condition of our neighbor Haiti, and just as little as the condition of Turkey. The United States has upset no system of government in the Philippines; it found revolution there, and it will leave the revolutionary forces successful and in possession.

I trust I have answered your question.

You think that I "should no doubt turn up my nose at the doctrine that trade follows the flag." Certainly I consider that obviously false. Trade scents the lowest price current, and does not care a copper about the flag. Canada trades with the United States three times more than with Britain; she even buys her union jacks in New York. The Republic which had not a foot of ground under its flag beyond its own impregnable, unequaled, compact domain, exported more of her products last year than any Nation in the world. Her exports exceeded in value even those of Britain, whose flag floats over a hundred distant possessions.

But the question of trade is the least important, the vital point being, are the volunteer soldiers of the Republic to be ordered to shoot down the patriotic soldiers who were fighting against the oppressor for their country's independence long before Admiral Dewey appeared, and who would be found fighting, if necessary, long after Admiral Dewey disappears, in the sacred cause of independence, and will they cheerfully obey? Bayonets in our volunteer army think.

Our young men volunteered to fight the oppressor; I shall be surprised if they relish the work of shooting down the oppressed. Not for such infamous work did they volunteer. Let us watch what they say and do, if a President of the United States ever dares so to order.

Sooner or later President McKinley must disband the volunteer army, because peace will soon be declared. It will be interesting to know what response will be made should he ask American citizens to volunteer to hold in subjection the people of the Philippines or any other people struggling for independence. There is not an enemy of the American Republic in the world that will not rejoice to see the Republic thus stultifying itself. I do not, I can not, believe that she is ever to be brought to such ineffable shame. She would be saved were the press in general as sane as THE TIMES upon this portentous issue.

ANDREW CARNEGIE.

New York, Oct. 22, 1898.

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Document 8, Page 1
Text of Telegram from Peace Commissioners to Secretary Hay
October 25, 1898

On October 25th, the Peace Commissioners wrote to Secretary of State Hay laying out their respective views on whether to keep all of the Philippine Islands or just part of them. As the original instructions to the Commissioners provided only for the retention of Luzon, the Commissioners saw fit to seek further instructions from Washington. In seeking the instructions, the Commissioners provided their respective views to Washington in the hopes of influencing the decision. In a separate telegram written the same day, Head of Delegation Day wrote of the need to offer the Spanish some concession in order to get them to agree to assume responsibility for Cuban debt. The responses to both of these cables are provided in Document 9.

Of the five Commissioners, three of them (Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, and Whitelaw Reid) supported keeping all of the Philippine Islands. (Their views are captured in paragraphs 2-11 below.) They argued that although national boundaries ought to follow natural divisions, there is no natural place for dividing the Philippines. Keeping all of the islands, they said, would be easier and certainly safer. They feared that division of the islands would promote rivalry which would then turn into lawlessness and turbulence "within gunshot of our shores." They further argued that if the United States did not want to keep all of the islands, it would be better to get the islands in the current negotiations and sell them ourselves rather than allow the islands to be sold by Spain to some potentially troubling party. The moral arguments that called for the United States to keep Luzon and Manila applied to the whole archipelago, they said. Finally, they pointed out the commercial reasons why the United States should keep all of the islands.

William Day, however, whose views are summarized in paragraphs 12-14 below, disagreed with the above three gentlemen, arguing that the United States' "colonial expansion" should be kept within bounds. With this, he argued that the United States should keep only certain islands that allow the United States to control entrance to the China Sea and providing additional harbors and ports of call.

The fifth Commissioner, George Gray, opposed taking the Philippines "in whole or in part." (His views are reflected in paragraphs 15-16 below.) He felt that to do so would be in contrast to long-standing principles on which our nation was founded. Taking of the islands, he argued would create a great military burden and cost U.S. taxpayers large sums of money. Gray also failed to see any benefits for American society, claiming that the "climate and social conditions [were] demoralizing to [the] character of American youth." Finally, and perhaps more importantly in his mind, annexation of the Philippines would mean that the United States was not "acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation." Gray reminds his Washington readers that the original instructions stated that the United States "had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest."

In the second telegram written on the 25th of October, we see the Commissioners explaining to Washington the difficult financial situation facing Spain. In particular, the Commissioners point out that if the United States expects Spain to assume responsibility for all of the Cuban debt, they would need concessions elsewhere, i.e., with respect to the Philippines. This suggestion is met with agreement in Washington, but it is suggested that any concession be made out of benevolence and not because of any technical or real obligation. The Commissioners, working with this guidance, later suggested that Spain be paid for any indebtedness it incurred for "necessary works and improvements of a Pacific character in the Philippine Islands." As will be seen in the instructions sent November 13th, Washington agreed with this suggestion, resulting in Spain being paid $20 million.

The full text of both of these October 25, 1898 telegrams from the Commissioners is provided below:

Document 8, Page 2
Text of Telegram from Peace Commissioners to Secretary Hay
October 25, 1898

[Telegram.]

No.16]
Paris, *October 25, 1898*

(Received on 25th and 26th.)

1. Differences in opinion among Commissioners concerning the Philippines are set forth in statements transmitted herewith. On these we request early consideration and explicit instructions. Liable now to be confronted with this question in joint commission almost immediately.

(signed) Day.

2. Information gained by Commission in Paris leads to conviction that it would be naval, political, and commercial mistake to divide the archipelago. Nearly all expert testimony taken tends to this effect. As instructions provide for retention at least of Luzon, we do not consider question of remaining in Philippine Islands at all as now properly before us. We therefore ask for extension of instructions.
3. Spain governed and defended these islands from Manila; and with destruction of her fleet and surrender of her army we became as complete masters of the whole group as she had been, with nothing needed to complete the conquest save proceed with the ample forces we had to take unopposed possession. The Ladrones and Carolines were also governed from the same capital by the same governor-general.
4. National boundaries ought to follow natural divisions, but there is no natural place for dividing the Philippines.
5. There is hardly a single island in the group from which you can not shoot across to one or more of the others. Scarcely another archipelago in the world in which the islands are crowded so closely together and so interdependent. Military and naval witnesses agree that it would be practically as easy to hold and defend the whole as a part. Some say easier; all say safer. Agree, too, that ample and trustworthy military force could be raised among natives, needing only United States officers and a small nucleus of United States troops; also that islands could be relieved from oppressive Spanish taxation and yet furnish sufficient revenue for the whole cost of administration and defense.
6. Great danger must result from division. Other islands, seeing benefits from our government of Luzon, are sure to revolt, and to be aided and encouraged by native of Luzon, thus repeating, in more aggravated form, our troubles with Spain about Cuba. Visayas already in revolt. Division would thus insure lawlessness and turbulence within gunshots of our shores, with no prospect of relief unless in Spanish sale of islands to unfriendly commercial rivals, which would probably happen if we hold the most important – Luzon – and release the others.
7. Generally expected now that this would be attempted the moment we released them. If such sale or transfer is to be made at all, would be less dangerous to our interests if done by us rather than by Spain. If we do not want the islands ourselves, better to control their disposition – i.e., to hold the option on them rather than to abandon it. Could then at least try to protect ourselves by ample treaty stipulations with the acquiring powers.
8. Commercially, division of archipelago would not only needlessly establish dangerous rivals at our door, but would impair value of part we kept. Present prosperity of Manila depends on its being natural center of import and export trade for the whole group. Large part of its business derived from Iloilo, Cebu, and other points in south. To yield these to unfriendly rivals would be to provide beforehand for diversions of business from our own possessions.
9. Moral obligations not to return Manila and Luzon to the oppressive power from which we have relieved them applies also to the rest of the archipelago, since Spanish power there is now broken and can not be restored without our consent. We believe public opinion in Europe, including that of Rome, expects us to retain whole of the Philippines,

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and would prefer that to any other solution save the impossible one of restoration of Spanish power over all islands.

10 If a division should be insisted on, the only one that seems to us admissible would be by a line from the Strait of San Bernadino, south of Masbate and north of Panay, to the northeast corner of Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan. This would control the China Sea, and give excellent ports of call along the whole line from Borneo to Hong Kong. But it would throw away the Visayas, including the best sugar, hemp, and tobacco islands. These contribute a large part of Manila's trade, and are inhabited generally by a people nearly as easy to manage as those of Luzon.

11 We are convinced that much injustice has been done inhabitants in published accounts of their character. Even the Mohammadenas of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, if left enjoyment of religious liberty and given freedom from oppressive taxation, would be found less intractable, in opinion of the experts, than under the rule of Spain; while the others would be comparatively easy to control, and glad to welcome strong and just rule of the United States.

(Signed) Cushman K. Davies., William P. Frye., and Whitelaw Reid.

12 I am unable to agree that we should peremptorily demand the entire Philippine group. In the spirit of our instructions, and bearing in mind that often declared disinterestedness of purpose and freedom from designs of conquest with which the war was undertaken, we should be consistent in our demands in making peace. Territory permanently held must be taken as war indemnity, and with due regard to our responsibility because of the conduct of our military and naval authorities in dealing with the insurgents. Whether this conduct was wise or unwise is not now important. We can not leave the insurgents to mere treaty stipulations or to their unaided resources, either to form a government or to battle against a foe which, unequal to us, might readily overcome them. On all hands it is agreed that the inhabitants of the islands are unfit for self-government. This is particularly true of Mindanao and the Sulu group.

13 Only experience can determine the success of colonial expansion upon which the United States is entering. It may prove inexpensive in proportion to the scale upon which it is tried with ignorant and semi-barbarous people at the other side of the world. It should, therefore, be kept within bounds. Accepting Luzon, strategic advantage, as shown by high naval authority, may require cession of that part of the group lying north and west of a line drawn through San Bernardino Strait, south of Luzon to San Bernardino Islet, and thence by the Naranjos Islands and certain courses and distances to Tambisan Island, on the northeast coast of Borneo, conveying to the United States Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, and various other islands, thus controlling the entrance to China Sea, with additional harbors and ports of call.

14 The objection that other islands will be acquired by European powers without regard to our interests can be obviated by treaty stipulation for nonalienation without the consent of the United States. There should also be stipulations for absolute freedom of trade and intercourse among all the islands of the group. This gives us practical control of the situation, with a base for the navy and commerce in the East, and responsibility for the people to whom we owe obligation and those most likely to become fit for self-government. It affords an opportunity for lessening the burden of colonial government, with room for further expansion if desired. It does not leave us open to the imputation of following agreement to negotiate with demand for whole subject-matter of discussion ourselves.

(Signed) William R. Day.

15 The undersigned can not agree that it is wise to take the Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would be to reverse accepted continental policy of country declared and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity governs case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed introduces us into European politics and the entangling alliances against which

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Washington and all American statesmen have protested. It will make necessary a navy equal to largest of powers, a greatly increased military establishment, immense sums for fortifications and harbors, multiply occasions for dangerous complications with foreign nations, and increase burdens of taxation. Will receive in compensation no outlet for American labor in labor market already overcrowded and cheap, no area for homes for American citizens – climate and social conditions demoralizing to character of American youth. New and disturbing questions introduced into our politics, church question menacing. On whole, instead of indemnity – injury. Undersigned can not agree that any obligation incurred to insurgents is paramount to our manifest interests. Attacked Manila as part of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to stay by them at conclusion of war. On contrary, interest and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and Cadiz. No place for colonial administration or government of subject people in American system.

16. So much from standpoint of interest. But even conceding all benefits claimed for annexation, we thereby abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from acting the part of a great, powerful, and Christian nation; we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, for doubtful material advantages and shameful stepping down from high moral position boastfully assumed. We should set example in these respects, not follow in the selfish and vulgar greed for territory which Europe has inherited from Mediæval times. Our declaration of war upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved all and more than our object, let us simply keep our word. Third article of protocol leaves everything concerning control of Philippines to negotiation between the parties. Absurd now to say that we will not negotiate, but will appropriate whole subject-matter of negotiation. At the very least, let us adhere to President's instructions, and if conditions require the keeping of Luzon forego the material advantages claimed in annexing other islands – above all, let us not make a mockery of the injunction contained in those instructions, where, after stating that "we took up arms only in obedience to the dictates of humanity and in the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations," and that "we had no design of aggrandizement and no ambition of conquest," the President, among other things, eloquently says: "It is my earnest wish that the United States in making peace should follow the same high rule of conduct which guided it in facing war. It should be as scrupulous and magnanimous in the concluding settlement as it was just and humane in its original action." This and more, of which I earnestly ask a reperusal, binds my conscience and governs my actions.
(Signed) George Gray.

* * * * * *

Mr. Day to Mr. Adee

[Telegram.]

Special (No.17 A).]

United States Peace Commission,
Paris, *October 25, 1898.*

(For the President.)

Our telegram No.15 to Secretary of State Hay informs you of the question put by us to Spanish Commissioners Monday. Last night Spanish ambassador called upon Mr.Reid. Represented that Spanish Commissioners must break off treaty rather than answer it in such wise as to abandon their claims on Cuban debt unless they could get some concession elsewhere. Mr. Reid assured ambassador that we could not assume this debt. The American people and Commission absolutely united upon it without exception and without distinction of

party. Ambassador then urged the question to be laid aside until it could be seen if some concessions elsewhere might be found which would save Spanish Commission from utter repudiation at home: if not, rupture was inevitable. Montero Rios could not return to Madrid now if known to have accepted entire Cuban indebtedness. Mr. Reid said Commissioners insisting on settlement of Cuban business now. Ambassador again said that if forced to direct answer on the question now must answer no, and break off conference. Mr. Reid earnestly urged them not to take that course, declaring that it must be far worse for Spain. Ambassador then begged him to search for some possible concession somewhere, and inquired about Philippine islands. Mr. Reid said that at first the American people not very eager for them. Believe, however, had practically conquered them when conquered capital, sunk fleet, and captured arms; and had right to all of them. Preponderance of sentiment in favor of taking all, but respectable and influential minority which did not go to that length. It was possible, he said, but not probable, that out of these conditions the Spanish Commissioners might be able to find something either in territory or in debt which might seem to their people at home like a concession. To-day Spanish Commissioners presented document (now being translated) which, we understand, accepts articles proposed by us, subject to agreement in final treaty, and invite proposals as to Philippines Islands from us. After meeting, Spanish secretary said to me that they accepted our articles in the hope of liberal treatment in Philippine Islands; said no government in Spain could sign treaty giving up everything and live, and that such surrender without some relief would mean national bankruptcy. He made further appeal, to which I made no answer, except to receive his communication. We shall now be in position to take up Philippine Island matter. We deem it proper that you should know exact situation before sending conventional instructions on Philippine Islands. We are inclined now to believe that rupture to-day only averted because Spaniards grasped at hint thrown out in the conversation of Mr. Reid last night with ambassador.

Thursday morning, 3.

Day.

Document 9
Text of Telegrams from Peace Commissioners to the State Department, October 26 and October 28, 1898

After receiving the telegrams contained in Document 8, Secretary Hay wrote back to Mr. Day on October 26th instructing the Commissioners to seek cession of all of the Philippine Islands. Another telegram was sent a couple days later elaborating on the October 26th instructions and implying that the Commissioners could offer some concession to Spain in return for agreement on the Philippines. The full text of these telegrams are as follows:

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Washington, *October 26, 1898.*

"The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, can not be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required. The President reaches this conclusion after most thorough consideration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides will best subserve the interests of the people involved, for whose welfare we can not escape responsibility."

HAY

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day

DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
Washington, *October 28, 1898.*

"While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition, control, and government the President prefers should be the subject of negotiations, as provided in the protocol. It is imperative upon us that as victors we should be governed only by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion should be our least concern; that we shall not shirk the moral obligations of our victory is of the greatest. It is undisputed that Spain's authority is permanently destroyed in every part of the Philippines. To leave any part in her feeble control now would increase our difficulties and be opposed to the interests of humanity. The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sentiment the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor can we invite another power or powers to join the United States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold them or turn them back to Spain.

"Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the President can see but one plain path of duty – the acceptance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more serious complications, administrative and international, would follow any other course. The President has given to the views of the Commissioners the fullest consideration, and in reaching the conclusion above announced, in the light of information communicated to the Commission and to the President since your departure, he has been influenced by the single consideration of duty and humanity. The President is not unmindful of the distressed financial condition of Spain, and whatever consideration the United States may show must come from its sense of generosity and benevolence, rather than from any real or technical obligation. The terms upon which the full cession of the Philippines shall be made must be left largely with the Commission. But as its negotiations shall proceed it will develop the Spanish position, and if any new phase

of the situation arise, the Commission can further communicate with the President. How these instructions shall be carried out and whether to be presented as a peremptory demand, the President leaves to the judgment and discretion of the Commissioners."

HAY .

Document 10
Text of Exchange Between Peace Commissioners and State Department Leading to Final Agreement

The first several telegrams included below highlight the inter-relationship between the settlement of the Cuban debt issue and the cession of the Philippines. Although separated by an ocean, the two issues were intricately linked in the peace discussions that brought an official end to the Spanish-American War. In order for Spain to accept full responsibility for Cuban indebtedness, Spain demanded that the United States provide some concession for the cession of the Philippines. While officially not linked, the United States would not have agreed to pay any compensation for the Philippines if Spain had not agreed to accept liability for Cuba's debts.

Many more cables crossed the Atlantic than can be replicated here. In one series not included, the Commissioners and Washington debated whether the U.S. could claim the Philippines on the basis of prior conquest. In another, they discussed what the appropriate amount of compensation might be. In a telegram sent to Washington November 11th, Commissioner Whitelaw Reid points out, for comparison sake, that the United States paid $12 million for Louisiana, $5 million for Florida, $15 million for territory acquired from Mexico under the treaty of Guadalupe, including New Mexico, Colorado, [and] California; $10 million for territories acquired by the Gadsden purchase, and seven million two hundred thousand dollars for Alaska. In the end, the Commissioners agreed upon $20 million.

At some points in early November 1898 it seemed that the Peace Talks would break down. This gave a sense of urgency to the Commissioners to reach agreement. Failure to reach agreement would have resulted in resumption of war against Spain, an alternative Washington did not find acceptable. Articles appeared in the European press stating that the United States had violated the protocol signed in August by placing unreasonable demands on the Spanish. The United States presented the Spanish Commissioners with a final proposal in mid-November. The Spanish, on November 29th, responded to the American ultimatum with a set of three options of their own. The United States rejected the three options, insisting on its original ultimatum. On November 29th, the Commissioners sent a telegram to Washington indicating that the Spanish Commission had agreed to the U.S. proposition. From that date until the date of signature, the Commissioners negotiated the final details of the peace agreement.

The ability of the Commissioners to react promptly to the proposals of the Spanish Commission hinged upon the ability to communicate electronically with Washington. Telegrams were able to be sent and answered on the same day, thus tremendously expediting the process. It is all the more remarkable if you remember that at the beginning of the 19th century, when the United States was trying to figure out how to respond to British Foreign Minister Canning's overtures in the period leading up to the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, correspondence between our diplomatic posts and Washington was written by hand and sent by boat, sometimes taking more than a month to reach its destination.

It is also important to note the process by which the negotiations were carried out. The Commissioners corresponded primarily with the State Department, which then represented the Commission in Washington. Then, based on instructions received from the President, the Secretary of State would send instructions to the Commissioners. While the Commissioners provided their input into the debate based on information gathered in the field, others in Washington were influenced not only by the views of the Commissioners but also those of the general public as portrayed in the press.

Extracts from the series of telegrams leading up to the final agreement are provided below:

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Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram]

Document 10, Page 2
Text of Exchange Between Peace Commissioners and State Department Leading to Final Agreement

No. 19] United States Peace Commission,
Paris, *October 29, 1898.*

Telegraphic instructions as to Philippine Islands received. We will, unless otherwise instructed, present on Monday an article to provide for cession of the whole group, together with statement that we are prepared to insert in the treaty a stipulation for the assumption by the United States of any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for necessary works and improvements of a pacific character in Philippine Islands.

Day.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram]

Department of State,
Washington, *October 30, 1898.*

Your No. 19 received. Your proposition to assume any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and improvements of a pacific character in the Philippines is approved.

Hay.

Mr. Frye to Mr. Adee.

[Telegram]

Paris, *October 30 1898.*

(For the President.)

It seems to me that the most undesirable happening would be our return without a treaty of peace, and yet that is probable in my opinion. If the Spanish Commissioners should accede to our demands as at present outlined they could not return home, while our country it may be would not justify us in tendering any more liberal terms. Spain made a determined fight to secure concessions as to the Cuban debt, while we were persistent in our refusal to yield anything. Our articles were accepted, but provisionally, for if no final agreement is reached they too failed. It seemed to me that we might have agreed to use our good offices with any government hereafter established in Cuba to secure the assumption by it of any indebtedness incurred [in] internal improvements there, and ourselves assume any like indebtedness in the territories finally ceded to us. The amount could not be large. Might we not go further, and agree to pay Spain from $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 if thus a treaty could be secured? If no treaty then war, a continued disturbance of business, an expenditure of a million dollars a day, and further loss of life. Would not our people prefer to pay Spain one-half of war expenditures rather than indulge in its costly luxury? Europe sympathizes with Spain in this regard exactly. The correspondent of the London Times, in his yesterday's letter, criticized severely our attitude. The precedents for the last century are antagonistic to our position. Of course we will not pay debts incurred in the suppression of colonial rebellions. I do not forget that we demand no money indemnity for cost of war to us. It may be because our enemy is bankrupt. I am sorry the Carolines were not taken by us as they are infinitely more valuable than the Ladrones. If war is resumed I hope orders will be given Dewey to seize at once all of Philippine Islands, also the Carolines.

You may be sure I should not make these suggestions if I did not regard a treaty of peace of vital importance to our country and the danger of failure to secure it gravely imminent.

Sunday, midnight.

Frye.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram]

Department of State,

Washington, *November 13, 1898.*

A treaty of peace is of the highest importance to the United States if it can be had without sacrifice of plain duty. The President would regret deeply the resumption of hostilities against a prostrate foe. We are clearly entitled to indemnity for the cost of the war. We can not hope to be fully indemnified. We do not expect to be. It would probably be difficult for Spain to pay money. All she has are the archipelagos of the Philippines and the Carolines. She surely can not expect us to turn the Philippines back and bear the cost of the war and all claims of our citizens for damages to life and property in Cuba without any indemnity but Puerto Rico, which we have, and which is wholly inadequate. Does Spain propose to pay in money the cost of the war and the claims of our citizens, and make full guaranties to the people of the Philippines, and grant to us concessions of naval and telegraph stations in the islands and privileges to our commerce, the same as enjoyed by herself, rather than surrender the archipelago? From the standpoint of indemnity both the archipelagos are insufficient to pay our war expenses; but, aside from this, do we not owe an obligation to the people of the Philippines which will not permit us to return them to the sovereignty of Spain? Could we justify ourselves in such a course, or could we permit their barter to some other power? Willing or not, we have the responsibility of duty which we can not escape.

You are therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines, and, if necessary, pay to Spain $10,000,000 to $20,000,000, and if you can get cession of a naval and telegraph station in the Carolines and the several concessions and privileges and guaranties, so far as applicable, enumerated in the views of Commissioners Frye and Reid, you can offer more. The President can not believe any division of the archipelago can bring us anything but embarrassment in the future. The trade and commercial side, as well as the indemnity for the cost of war, are questions we might yield. They might be waived or comprised, but the questions of duty and humanity appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out. You have the largest liberty to lead up to these instructions, but unreasonable delay should be avoided.

Hay.

Mr. Day to Mr. Adee.

[Telegram.]

Paris, *November 15, 1898.*

(For the President. Special.)

Your final instruction on Philippine Islands received. We are formulating proposals for treaty in accord therewith. Spaniards asked and we granted adjournment to Wednesday. They say have not received copies from Madrid which are needed. It is probable that Spanish Commissioners will not sign treaty, but this is only surmise. Spanish sources are filling European press with charges of violation of protocol and understanding at Washington in claim now made for Philippine Islands. You have no doubt seen our counter statements sent out by Associated Press. If we break, I think pretty full synopsis of correspondence and negotiations leading to protocol should appear in American, also in friendly press on this side. We shall pursue this course, unless you disapprove.

Tuesday, morning, 2.30.

Day.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, *November 15, 1898.*

(Special.)

The President earnestly hopes there may be no break, but approves the suggestion made in your special of this date.

Hay.

Document 10, Page 4
Text of Exchange Between Peace Commissioners and State Department Leading to Final Agreement

Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 24. Special.] Paris, *November 15, 1898.*

Unless otherwise instructed the American Commissioners propose to present to the Spanish Commissioners, perhaps at the joint meeting to-morrow, the following proposition as embodying final position of our Government in the present negotiations:

"The proposal presented by the American Commissioners in behalf of their Government for the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States having been rejected by the Spanish Commissioners, and the counter proposal of the latter for the withdrawal of the American forces from the islands and the payment of an indemnity by the United States to Spain having been rejected by the American Commissioners, the American Commissioners, deeming it essential that the present negotiations, which have already been greatly protracted, should be brought to an early and definite conclusion, beg now to present a new proposition embodying the concessions which, for the sake of peace, their Government is under the circumstances willing to tender.

"The Government of the United States is unable to modify the proposal heretofore made for the cession of the entire archipelago of the Philippine Islands; but the American Commissioners are authorized to offer Spain, in case the cession should be agreed to, the sum of $20,000,000, to be paid in accordance with the terms to be fixed in the treaty of peace; and, it being the policy of the United States to maintain in the Philippines Islands an open door to the commerce of the World, the American Commissioners are prepared to insert in the treaty now in contemplation a stipulation to the effect that for a term of years Spanish ships and merchandise shall be admitted into the ports of the Philippines on the same terms as American ships and merchandise. The American Commissioners are also authorized and prepared to insert in the treaty, in connection with the cessions of [territory] by Spain to the United States, a provision for the mutual relinquishment of all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of the United States, that may have arisen since the beginning if the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the conclusion of the treaty of peace.

"Upon the acceptance by the Spanish Commissioners of the proposal herein made as to Philippines Islands, in connection with the demands as to Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other Spanish islands in the West Indies, and Guam, heretofore provisionally agreed to, but not otherwise, it will be possible for the Joint Commission to proceed to the consideration and adjustment of other matters, including those which, as subsidiary and incidental to the principal provisions, should form a part of the treaty of peace. In particular, the American Commissioners desire to treat of religious freedom in the Caroline Islands as agreed to in 1886, of the release of prisoners now held [by] Spain for political offenses in connection with the insurrection of Cuba and Philippines Islands, the acquisition of the island of Kusaie or Ualand in the Carolines for a naval and telegraph station, and of cable-landing rights at other places in Spanish jurisdiction and the revival (of) certain treaties heretofore in force between the United States and Spain."

Tuesday evening, 6.20.

Moore.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, *November 16, 1898.*

(Special.)

Your No. 24 received. The course proposed is approved.

Hay.

Text of Exchange Between Peace Commissioners and State Department Leading to Final Agreement

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 26] United States Peace Commission,
Paris, *November 21, 1898.*

We presented this afternoon our proposal as telegraphed you in our No. 24. We expressed expectation of American Commissioners that final and definite answer be given not later than 28th instant. Also submitted answer to Spanish contention as to the construction of protocol. They said we should have answer on Wednesday.

Monday evening, 9.

Day.

Mr. Day to Mr. Adee.

[Telegram.]

Paris, *November 22, 1898.*

(For the President. Special.)

If the Spanish Commissioners refuse our proposition to-morrow, we shall give notice that our offer was final and nothing remains except to close negotiations.

Tuesday, 2.20 afternoon.

Day.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, *November 22, 1898.*

(Special.)

Your special to the President dated to-day received. Your proposed action approved.

Hay.

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 26 A.] Paris, *November 23, 1898.*

Spanish Commissioners did not answer our proposal to-day. Sent note saying wanted time to communicate with Madrid. Will give answer soon, certainly before 28th.

Wednesday, evening, 10.30.

Day.

Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

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No. 27] Paris, *November 25, 1898.*

President of our Commission received last night from the president of the Spanish Commission a communication submitting for adoption in lieu of our final proposition of last Monday any one of the three following alternative propositions:

First. Relinquishment by Spain of her sovereignty over Cuba and cession of Puerto Rico and other Antilles, the islands of Guam in the Ladrones, and the Philippine Islands archipelago, including Mindanao and Sulu, to the United States, the latter paying to Spain the sum of $100,000,000 as compensation for her sovereignty over the archipelago and the works of public utility which she has executed during her rule in all the islands of the east and west, the sovereignty over which she relinquishes or cedes.

Second. Cession to the United States of the island of Kusaie, in the Carolines, of the right to land a cable on any of these or of the Marianas, while they remain under Spanish rule, and cession of the Philippine Islands archipelago proper — that is, beginning on the north, the islands of Batanes, Babuyanes, Luzon, Visayas, and all the others following to the south as far as the Sulu sea, Spain reserving to the south of this sea the island of Mindanao and Sulu, which have never formed a part of the Philippine Islands archipelago proper. The United States as compensation for said islands, for the right to land cables, and for the public works executed by Spain in said islands during her rule will pay to Spain the sum of $50,000,000.

Third. Spain relinquishes her sovereignty over Cuba and gratuitously cedes to the United States the Philippines Islands archipelago proper, besides Puerto Rico, the other West Indies, and the Island of Guam, which she cedes as compensation for the expenses of the war and as indemnity to American citizens for injuries suffered since the beginning of the last Cuban insurrection. The United States and Spain will submit to an arbitral tribunal what are the debts and the obligations of a colonial character which should pass with the islands the sovereignty over which Spain relinquishes and cedes.

On these propositions the commissioners hold the following views: Messrs. Day, Davis, and Reid think we are committed to our final proposition of last Monday: Commissioners Frye and Gray favor submitting a proposal to leave to Spain Mindanao and Sulu group and take instead Ualan or Strong Island in the Carolines, paying only $20,000,000. Mr. Day would favor this if it were an original proposition. He believes that Mindanao and Sulu group can be readily separated from the other islands and that with their population they are likely to be a source of trouble and expense, and are not desirable for us. He thinks Ualan or Strong Island would be very valuable to us, and he would prefer it. He also thinks that this concession would probably bring a treaty and that it may be that our present ultimatum will; but as already stated, he thinks our only consistent course now is to stand by that ultimatum. Commissioner Gray prefers above all acceptance of third proposition.

Our Commissioners desire to answer to President of Spanish Commissioner to-morrow, Friday afternoon, 4.30.

Moore.

Mr. Davis to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 28] Paris, *November 25, 1898.*

I desire to add to my views as stated in Mr. Moore's telegram that I think the propositions there stated are an afterthought contrived to protract and embarrass the negotiations after Spain had received our deliberate ultimatum, which has been given out as such to our people and to the world. The United States having so taken its position ought not to recede. I think that Spain will accept our ultimatum if we firmly insist upon it.

Friday afternoon, 5.

C.K. Davis.

Mr. Gray to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 29] Paris, *November 25, 1898.*

Our having submitted an ultimatum does not in my opinion preclude us from adopting a course that will prove more advantageous to our country. My reasons for accepting third proposition in the letter of the president of the Spanish Commission are, briefly, that in paying twenty millions we do not prevent the raising hereafter of the question of the liability of the sovereign of the relinquished and ceded territory for some part of the so-called colonial debts. When raised we must either flatly refuse to consider it and take the consequences, or must arbitrate. We have nothing to fear from arbitration, but have much to gain in moral prestige and maintenance of our preeminence in recognizing the obligations of international law. By adopting this course we pay nothing to Spain, and settle instead of postpone the question of liability and carry the principle of arbitration with us into the new century.

George Gray.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, *November 25, 1898.*

The President has considered the three proposals of the President of the Spanish Commission submitted to you. He finds no reason for departing from his last instruction and your proposal thereunder. His instructions are that you adhere to your last proposal and decline those of the Spanish Commission.

He repeats his instruction of November 13, by which you are authorized, in case of cession of an island in Carolines, and other concessions mentioned by Messrs. Frye and Reid to offer additional compensation. If negotiations in regard to Philippines are successful, you will communicate to the President what amount is required for Strong Island, and he will instruct you.

Hay.

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

Paris, *November 27, 1898.*

* * Paris Herald to-day publishes telegram from Washington saying we have increased our demand to include Sulu group. This incorrect report tends to create impression that we are increasing our claims after ultimatum. * *
Sunday night, 12.

Day.

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 31.] Paris, *November 29, 1898.*

Spanish Commissioners at to-day's conference presented a definite and final acceptance of our last proposition. Next meeting on Wednesday, at which time we will present articles on other matters. They expressed a desire to reach a conclusion promptly. We hope to make good progress from this time.

Monday afternoon, 3.15.

Day.

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The President to Mr. Day.

[Telegram.]

Executive Mansion,
Washington, *November 29, 1898.*

Message just received. The commissioners have my profound thanks.
William McKinley

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

No. 37] Paris, *December 8, 1898.*

At the session to-day we agreed upon all the articles of the treaty so far as an agreement could be reached. They refused to sell Kusaie. Will send you a summary to-morrow as soon as treaty is engrossed. We meet to sign duplicate; think we can sign on Saturday of this week.

Thursday afternoon, 5.20.

Day.

Mr. Hay to Mr. Day.

[Telegram.]

Department of State,
Washington, *December 8, 1898.*

Your No.37 received. The president sends to all of you his most cordial thanks and congratulations. Permit me to add my own.

John Hay.

Mr. Moore to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

Paris, *December 10, 1898.*

Treaty as agreed on will consist of preamble and seventeen articles, as follows:

First. Relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the assumption by the United States of any obligation under international law for the protection of life and property during occupation.

Second. Cession of Puerto Rico and other islands in West Indies and Guam.

Third. Cession of Philippine Islands archipelago and the payment of twenty millions within three months after the exchange of ratifications.

Fourth. Admission of Spanish ships and merchandise to Philippine Islands for ten years on the same terms as American ships and merchandise.

Fifth. Evacuation of Philippine Islands by Spain: immediate return of Spanish soldiers at Manila by the United States to Spain: disposition of war material and armaments in Philippine Islands and Guam.

Sixth. General release and return of prisoners, military and political.

Seventh. Mutual relinquishment of claims arising since the beginning of the insurrection in Cuba and before the exchange of ratifications; the United States to adjudicate and settle claims of its own citizens.

Eighth. Transfer of public property, archives, records.

Ninth. Citizenship in relinquished and ceded territories. Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, may, within a year, elect to retain Spanish nationality. Civil rights and political status of native inhabitants of ceded territories to be determined by Congress.

Tenth. Protection of all persons in their religion.

Eleventh. Jurisdiction of court.

Twelfth. Preservation of pending judicial proceedings.

Thirteenth. Protection of copyrights and patents in ceded and relinquished territories.

Fourteenth. Appointment of consuls by Spain in such territories.

Fifteenth. Each country to accord to merchant vessels of other same treatment as to its own in respect of port charges.

Sixteenth. Any obligations assumed by the United States as to Cuba limited to time of occupation, but the United States will at the end of occupancy advise any government established in Cuba to assume same obligations.

Seventeenth. The exchange of ratifications at Washington within six months after signature of treaty.

Treaty expected to be signed this afternoon.

Moore.

Mr. Day to Mr. Hay.

[Telegram.]

Paris, *December 10, 1898 — 10.15 p. m.*

Treaty signed at 8.50 this evening.

Document 11
Excerpts from the Treaty of Peace

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE KINGDOM OF SPAIN.

Signed at Paris, December 10, 1898.
Ratification advised by the Senate, February 6, 1899.
Ratified by the President, February 6, 1899.
Ratified by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, March 19, 1899.
Ratifications exchanged at Washington, April 11, 1899.
Proclaimed, Washington, April 11, 1899.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas, a Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her August Son Don Alfonso XIII, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on the tenth day of December, 1898, the original of which convention being in the English and Spanish languages, is word for word as follows:

The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the Name of Her August Son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States,

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States;

and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain,

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, President of the Senate,

Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown,

Don José de Garnica, Deputy to the Cortes and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court;

Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and

Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division;

Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ARTICLE II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.

ARTICLE III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipeligo known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of

longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States....

ARTICLE X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion....

ARTICLE XV.

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other....

ARTICLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

[SEAL]	WILLIAM R. DAY
[SEAL]	CUSHMAN K. DAVIS
[SEAL]	WM P FRYE
[SEAL]	GEO. GRAY
[SEAL]	WHITELAW REID.

And whereas, the said Convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two Governments were exchanged in the City of Washington, on the eleventh day of April, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-nine;

Now, therefore, be it known that I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Convention to be made public, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this eleventh day of April, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety nine, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-third.

WILLIAM McKINLEY

[SEAL] By the President:
JOHN HAY
Secretary of State

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ANNEXATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

Time Line

1897 McKinley succeeds Cleveland as President. Appoints John Sherman as Secretary of State and General Stewart Lyndon Woodford as Minister to Spain.

Jan. 25, 1898 Battleship Maine sails to Cuba

Feb. 15, 1898 9:40 pm. Maine blown up in Cuba harbor. Spanish blamed at time but recent historians believe boat self-ignited. 262 men killed.

Late Feb. 1898 Commodore George Dewey sails Olympia to Hong Kong in anticipation of action in the Philippines.

Feb. 25, 1898 Cable from Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt to Dewey stating that in event of war with Spain, Dewey's duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then to conduct offensive operations against the Philippines.

Mar. 6, 1898 McKinley asks House Appropriations Committee for $50 million in military funds in order to be prepared for possible war. The request was passed unanimously.

Apr. 19, 1898 Congress passes war resolution, the only time in history that Congress voted for war without a direct request from the President. Resolution contains the Teller Amendment disavowing any intentions to annex Cuba. Dewey was forced to leave Hong Kong because of the British declaration of neutrality (as opposed to the Congress' declaration of war). War officially declared on April 21, 1898.

Apr. 22, 1898 Dewey asks for and receives instructions to go to the Philippines, to capture and destroy the Spanish.

Late April 1898 U.S. begins blockade of Cuba.

Apr. 28, 1898 William Day succeeds John Sherman as Secretary of State.

May 1, 1898 Dewey defeats Spanish at Manila Bay. (Spaniards still control the island.)

May 19, 1898 McKinley issues ambiguous directive on the Philippines stating that America's purpose was twofold: to reduce Spanish power and to introduce order and security to the islands.

August 12, 1898 Spain and United States sign the Protocol of Agreement Embodying the Terms of a Basis for the Establishment of Peace Between the United States and Spain.

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(This document laid out the framework for the Treaty of Paris eventually signed on December 10, 1898.)

September 30, 1898 John Hay succeeds Day as Secretary of State. (Until then, Hay had been the U.S. Minister in London.)

November 1898 Anti-imperialist leagues begin to form.

December 10, 1898 Treaty of Paris signed. In Article III, Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands and the United States agrees to pay Spain the sum of twenty million dollars. In article IV, the U.S. promises to admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States, i.e., to grant Spanish goods national treatment.

December 21, 1898 President McKinley informed the Secretary of War that with the signing of the treaty on December 10th, the future control of the Philippine Islands was ceded to the United States. He asserted that occupation of the Philippines was necessary and ordered a military government extended to the whole of the ceded territory.

January 1899 Senate approves the Treaty with a margin of 2 votes. (Bacon resolution, carrying a pledge of Philippines independence was defeated by a vote cast by Vice President Hobart.

February 4, 1899 Outbreak of Philippines insurrection.

February 6, 1899 Treaty with Spain ratified by Senate (57 to 27).

March/April 1899 Anti-imperialist pamphlets drafted by Edward Atkinson of Boston and Brookline sent to Secretary of War and later to prominent officials in the Philippines. April 2, 1899 the U.S. Postmaster General ordered the San Francisco Postmaster to remove all of the pamphlets from Manila mail. This attracted lots of attention throughout the United States, raising questions of freedom of speech.

November 1900 Bryan defeated as the Democratic Presidential candidate. This defeat marks the end of anti-imperialism as an important factor in American politics.

March 2, 1901 Congress gives the President authority to govern the Philippines only until otherwise provided by Congress, exercising its rights and responsibilities with respect to foreign policy.

Spring 1901 Emilio Aguinaldo captured and forced to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. He signed a proclamation recommending abandonment of any further resistance. Other Filipinos continued to fight. By spring 1902, When fighting ceased, there were over 120,000 U.S. servicemen in the Philippines.